MEDIUM-TERM CONJUNCTURAL ANALYSIS (1985-2024)

Document approved at the 3rd session of the 1st Congress of the Libertarian Socialist Organisation (ConOSL), held in July 2025

2025

To understand what is happening (the situation), it is necessary to think correctly. And thinking correctly means organising and processing, in an appropriate manner, the vast amount of data that is produced about reality. Thinking correctly is an indispensable condition for correctly analysing what is happening in a country at a given moment in the history of that country or any other. This requires […] a system of concepts, a theory. […] In order to propose a programme, it is necessary to understand the economic, political and ideological reality of our country. The same applies to formulating a sufficiently clear and concrete political line. […] The party needs a clear framework for thinking coherently about the country and the region […] throughout history. We need to have an effective repository to organise the growing mass of data relating to our economic, political and ideological reality. And we need to have a method for processing this data. To see which is most important, which should be used first and which later. So that we can correctly manage our available resources for each area of work.

Uruguayan Anarchist Federation
1972

INTRODUCTION
Libertarian social theory and the Brazilian conjuncture

ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONJUNCTURE
Three periods in global power relations
Crisis of the socialist bloc in the context of the Cold War
US imperialism and its global hegemony
Re-emergence of China, Russia and BRICS
Neoliberalism, transnational oligopolies and growing inequalities
Liberal consensus and liberalisation of the left
Neoliberal culture, knowledge and beliefs
Global environmental collapse
Structural and conjunctural dimensions of the economic crisis
Liberal democracy in check and the rise of the far right
Women, the LGBT+ community and patriarchy
Racialised peoples, indigenous peoples and racism
Other contributions on the Middle East, Africa and Latin America
Wars between states and civil wars
Class struggle, popular movements and the revival of anarchism
Confronting neoliberalism, authoritarianism and national oppression
Confronting racism, patriarchy and environmental destruction

LIBERTARIAN SOCIAL THEORY AND THE BRAZILIAN CONJUNCTURE

• This document summarises the results of a study carried out by our organisation, which aimed to apply the fundamentals of libertarian materialism/realism and libertarian social theory that we defend to understanding the medium-term conjuncture in Brazil, covering the period from 1985 to 2024. The fundamentals of this libertarian materialism or realism, as well as this libertarian social theory, were outlined in a previous document, “Our Principles and General Strategy,” which can be read online and in book form. It contains the theoretical and methodological foundations of the present study.
• However, before presenting this study, it is important to understand what it is and what it is not. It is not a study on the structure of capitalism-statism, nor on Brazilian social formation, which serve to support our general strategy. Nor is it a simple study on the Brazilian conjuncture, with a short-term approach, which serves to support our tactics. At other times, we have devoted ourselves to such studies, which are also fundamental and should be considered complementary to this one. The present analysis is a study of the current conjuncture – which we defined elsewhere as “a scenario composed of a set of events […] that mark everyday social life” – but of the medium-term conjuncture. It addresses Brazil over the last four decades, attempting to extrapolate the most immediate readings and assess more lasting trends that accompany longer-term economic, political, and cultural cycles.
• Bearing in mind, as Alfredo Errandonea teaches us, that Brazil has always been part of an international system of domination and has remained a dependent, subordinate and peripheral country, this analysis of the medium-term conjuncture is divided into two parts. The first presents aspects of the international conjuncture that we consider relevant to understanding not only how the contemporary world works, but also its impact on Brazil. The second presents aspects of the Brazilian conjuncture that we consider relevant to understanding Brazil between 1985 and 2024. It is important to note that much of the data presented on the world and Brazil are broad averages, and we must not forget that these averages often hide immense class, national and regional inequalities. As this is not an academic work, we have chosen not to cite the many sources we have used. In addition to this being a militant study, doing so would take up a huge amount of space in an already lengthy document. Hundreds of books, academic studies, newspaper articles and institutional reports were consulted. The countless data presented were taken from this material, from international databases and studies (such as the World Bank, IMF, UN, OECD, Oxfam, etc.) and national ones (IBGE, IPEA, ILAESE, DIEESE, etc.).

THREE PERIODS IN GLOBAL POWER RELATIONS

• Looking at the international reality as a whole, a central aspect of the period between 1985 and 2024 concerns the scenarios that resulted from the global power relations established between the major national powers during those years. At first, extending into the 1990s, the world witnessed the final years of the Cold War and the resulting bipolarisation between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR). However, due to the crisis that befell the so-called socialist bloc – whose most important milestone was the end of the USSR in 1991 (and, to a lesser extent, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) – the world entered a second period, which was the longest in the years analysed, of absolute and unipolar hegemony of the USA. As a result, US imperialism expanded globally in economic, political and cultural terms. However, due to the constant movement of reality, it has become increasingly evident in recent years that the world has entered a third period, characterised by the emergence of China’s international social power and, along with it, the resurgence of Russia and, to some extent, the global south. Almost all recent major international events are related to or directly explained by the US reaction to this loss of global space.

CRISIS OF THE SOCIALIST BLOC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COLD WAR

• The widespread crisis of the so-called socialist bloc, which led to the end of the Cold War, worsened considerably throughout the 1980s and can be explained by external and internal factors. Between 1980 and 1985, the Soviet Union was already experiencing economic stagnation marked by low productivity and a shortage of consumer goods. There was also growing internal opposition to the war resulting from the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and instability in the government, which sought to be overcome with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev – first in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and then in the USSR itself between 1985 and 1988. During those years, the CPSU negotiated the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, re-established closer ties with Europe, began negotiations with the United States on nuclear arms control, and began to converge with the West in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Key milestones during this period were “Perestroika,” a restructuring that allowed for a multi-party system and promoted entrepreneurship with a view to resuming economic growth, and “Glasnost,” an opening that expanded freedom of expression and of the press and freed political prisoners.
• The USSR collapsed in late 1991 as a result of a combination of factors. First, due to the victory of a sector of the Soviet bureaucracy favourable to liberalising policies of opening up to the West and private capital, under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, over another sector of that bureaucracy, which advocated a more conservative (closed and statist) line, and which failed in an attempted coup d’état in August 1991. Second, because of the numerous nationalist protests that intensified from 1988 onwards, which affected the Baltic, Caucasus and Ukrainian republics. And also because of the independence processes that intensified after the CPSU lost the 1990 elections. Thirdly, due to the difficulties of the socialist bloc’s survival in the context of the Cold War and the geopolitical power game, even though the disintegration of the USSR was not the goal of the US, which feared the fate of Soviet military resources. The fact is that the process of opening up and privatising everything that belonged to the former Soviet state integrated Eastern Europe into Western capitalism and gave rise to new local ruling classes. Marked by enormous corruption, this process not only transformed former bureaucrats into new oligarchs, but also favoured the emergence and strengthening of mafia organisations, particularly in Russia.
• Other events contributed to this crisis in the socialist bloc, notably the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the reunification of Germany the following year, which also allowed its integration into Western capitalism. This was the result of a movement of rapprochement between West Germany and East Germany, which gained relevance in the 1970s and 1980s. During those two decades, already in the context of the crisis in the USSR, this movement progressively reduced tensions between the two countries, allowing certain visits, condemning the use of violence, recognising the autonomy of the two countries, while emphasising that “the German people are one”. The events that triggered the fall of the wall and reunification took place in 1989: the easing of border restrictions – initially with Hungary, which allowed many people to travel to West Germany via Austria – and the successful protests against the government demanding reforms.
• In addition to the integration of the former Soviet Union countries and Germany into Western capitalism, another event that aggravated this crisis was the fate of other countries ruled by communist parties. These countries basically took two paths. Some of them reinforced their progressive opening to private and Western capital, while maintaining single-party governments and much stricter state control over the economy; the most relevant case is that of China, although Vietnam and Laos can also be mentioned. Others remained more closed and fully nationalised, also with single-party governments and closer to the bureaucratic experiences of the Cold War era; such are the cases of Cuba and North Korea, more isolated on the international stage and victims of US embargoes.

UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM AND ITS GLOBAL HEGEMONY

• The decades following the end of the Cold War provided the conditions for the realisation of the imperialist vocation of the United States, which assumed a hegemonic position as a great imperialist and dominant power in the world. With this, the US ruling classes imposed themselves globally in the economic, political and intellectual-moral (cultural) fields. The guiding principle of this process was the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine, which sought to guarantee US hegemony in the world and extend it beyond the North Atlantic.
• In (geo)economic terms, this domination was established through a three-pronged approach: the hegemony of the dollar, the financial supremacy of the US financial market, and the rise of neoliberalism. The US economic project based on this tripod was a response to the rise of its allies (Western Europe and Japan) and to factors of class struggle within the countries of central capitalism, with the resulting decline in profit rates in the 1960s and 1970s (which occurred due to the division of income at the centre of capitalism). The central movement occurred in 1971, when the US government unilaterally abandoned the Bretton Woods system, broke unilaterally with the gold standard, and forced the world to adopt floating exchange rates. With the 1973 Oil Crisis – which led to economic and productivity slowdowns; growth in inflation, public deficit and unemployment; and reserve evasion – the dollar was established as the sole currency for settling oil contracts. In this way, the US weakened national banks and favoured private operators in the control of global finances. Attempts to place limits on these measures – initially led by Germany, France and Japan, and later by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – failed in the 1970s. In addition, the United States raised its domestic interest rates and ended control over international economic capital movements. With these measures, it attracted capital from around the world, strengthening the dollar and Wall Street’s financial interests, thus ensuring its supremacy in the international monetary and financial system. Finally, this process was reinforced by a change in economic ideology, which turned neoliberalism into a widely accepted consensus, led by the administrations of Ronald Reagan (US) and Margaret Thatcher (UK).
• Since the end of the Cold War, the dollar has remained the world’s main currency for transactions and reserves. The benefits of this for the United States have been and continue to be enormous, given the possibility they have to issue dollars (and thus pay for imports and external liabilities), control credit and set interest rates (and thus determine the interest on their own external debt), as well as the huge shift of international economic capital to their own country for the purchase of government bonds. This has consolidated the United States as the preferred location for investments by the ruling classes and governments around the world. In addition, since the 1990s, the US has promoted the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus internationally, marked by deregulation, privatisation, and trade liberalisation. Since 1994, it has even experimented with a free trade area with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA), the results of which have been disastrous for workers and the environment. However, despite this emphasis on promoting neoliberalism, the US has maintained a highly interventionist state in the economy, particularly with the development of its military-industrial complex and protectionism that favours its transnational companies around the world and sectors of its economy such as steel, aluminium and agriculture. During the 20th century, the United States secured its privileged position in the international division of labour, dedicating itself to high value-added production (knowledge and technology) and controlling strategic production and technology chains. Since the end of the Cold War, it has enjoyed enormous growth in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP): in the three decades between 1991 and 2021, its GDP has multiplied almost fourfold, and its GDP per capita has almost tripled.1 This enormous economic strength has also benefited from the massive presence of its companies around the world (multinationals, transnationals) and from the policies promoted by institutions – including multilateral ones – under its control. This allows US imperialism – and, therefore, the ruling classes of the US – to determine a fundamental part of the process of economic capital accumulation in the world and, thus, the inequalities of wealth and income that derive from it.
• In (geo)political terms, the US sought to emerge from the crisis of the 1970s by expanding its military domination. Against a backdrop of political and military setbacks in different parts of the globe, it broke with its policy of ‘détente’ and moved towards more direct and open confrontation. The military arm of US imperialism was reinforced in the 1980s with the argument of “manifest destiny”: the belief that the US has a divine mission to expand its dominion throughout the world and thereby lead it to salvation – something that reinforced its own position as “the judge” of the world. With the end of the USSR and military victories in the Gulf War (1991), the United States redesigned its geopolitical strategy. It planned several interventions aimed at establishing a “new world order”, that is, a renewed global hierarchy, at the top of which they themselves would be.
• To consolidate its geopolitical position, the American empire acted on two fronts. First, it expanded its military force around the globe and intervened directly and indirectly in other countries. The US not only coordinated the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but also its hegemony within it. Between 1999 and 2009, NATO expanded eastward and, in addition to countries that were already members – such as the US, the UK, France, Italy, and Germany – it began to include others, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, Romania, and Croatia. This expansion allowed the US to extend its military bases to all strategic regions of the world. In 2015, there were 800 such bases outside US territory; in Latin America, there are bases in numerous countries, notably Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Puerto Rico. Both Democratic and Republican administrations contributed to this advance. Among the numerous direct military interventions carried out by the US during this period, the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) stand out, as well as those that affected countries such as Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Yemen, Haiti, and Libya. There were also indirect interventions, which encouraged coups and changes of government in different countries. During Bill Clinton’s administration alone (1993-2001), the United States promoted 48 military interventions, almost triple the 16 that were carried out during the entire Cold War. On a second front, the American empire acted to prevent the strengthening of competing powers – neutralising them or placing them under military threat or sanctions – and to avoid international agreements that would jeopardise its imperialist domination. The US did everything it could to neutralise countries such as China, Russia and India, with measures ranging from arbitrary interventions at the UN to the installation of military bases in nearby regions. It also did everything possible to control routes and the extraction of natural resources, such as energy and oil in Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin; it intervened in conflicts around the world, directly and indirectly, and profited greatly from the sale of arms to countries in conflict. On both fronts, regardless of the discursive justifications they received, these interventions had the sole purpose of contributing to the increase in the global social power of the United States, its bourgeoisie and its bureaucracy. Whether to maintain this “new world order” or to guarantee profits for its companies, the protagonism of its government and its armed forces – for example, by imposing its laws on the world and freeing its businessmen and military from international courts – or the strategic control of routes (such as the Panama Canal) and resources (such as oil and gas). It was for this reason that the US did not make any concrete commitments to environmental preservation, as evidenced by its boycotts of the Kyoto Protocol (for the reduction of greenhouse gases, 1997) and the Basel Convention (for the proper disposal of waste, 1989/1992).
• This imperialist force was further stimulated by the massive spread of American culture throughout the world, based on values, habits and lifestyles typical of this form of capitalism-statism. Among these, in addition to the aforementioned “manifest destiny”, are consumerism and individualism, which stimulated, on the one hand, the creation of infinite consumer needs, as well as the acquisition and permanent replacement of unnecessary goods and services; and, on the other hand, the views that happiness is achieved through consumption, that wealth is the only criterion for success, that meritocracy explains and justifies inequalities, that competition between everyone is normal and even desirable, etc. This diffusion was carried out in ways that were more or less conflictive. In the first case, it involved both the transnationalisation of the US cultural industry – through cinema (Hollywood), television and radio; films, series, music (rock, pop, hip-hop) – and the spread of English as a global language (for business, science and culture) and the fashion industry and its own international standards of beauty. It is obvious that such arts and forms of culture are not, in themselves, imperialist; even though they are being mobilised in the sense mentioned above, they also have the potential for raising awareness and criticism, depending on how they are mobilised. In the second case, the United States began to pressure the whole world to adopt its own values and practices, in particular its arbitrary conceptions of human rights and democracy; it decided to classify countries according to these criteria, imposing sanctions and directly and indirectly confronting those that did not comply.

RE-EMERGENCE OF CHINA, RUSSIA AND BRICS

• Throughout the early 21st century, two historical powers have regained their place in the world: China and Russia. Both have been coordinating with other countries in the BRICS economic bloc in an attempt to establish a counterbalance to the domination of the United States and its Western European allies.
• This re-emergence of China was consolidated under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1992) who, taking advantage of the industrial and rural developments achieved during Mao Tse-Tung’s rule (1949-1976), promoted a growing openness to private economic capital from abroad (foreign investment and foreign trade), breaking with the isolation of the previous period. This was achieved with the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs): areas where foreign capital was allowed to enter to form partnerships with Chinese state economic capital; and was made possible by the liberalisation of the use of agricultural production surpluses in trade. The 1980s and 1990s saw the modernisation of agriculture, industry, science/technology and defence in China. This modernisation had a direct impact on industrial production, which grew in complexity from the 1990s to the 2000s – for example, by decreasing low value-added textile production and increasing high value-added electronic production. This was reinforced by China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. These conditions have elevated China to the position of a constantly expanding industrial power in the world. In 30 years (1993-2023), China’s GDP has multiplied by 40, going from just under half a trillion to almost US$ 18 trillion. From 2010 onwards, China has remained the world’s second largest economy, behind only the US, and is expected to reach the top position in the next 10 years. This is a huge economic growth, but it has come at the cost of dramatic environmental destruction and a huge increase in labour exploitation and social inequality. Despite having lifted more than 800 million people out of extreme poverty in the last four decades, China currently has almost 10% of the world’s millionaires and hundreds of billionaires.
• In this most recent period, Xi Jinping’s leadership stands out. He assumed the presidency in 2013 and is the longest-serving leader since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. He has strengthened control over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and implemented a series of measures to modernise the country, which was already an economic powerhouse in the early 2010s. He benefited from a constitutional reform in 2018 that ended presidential term limits, allowing him to serve a third term starting in 2022. Xi Jinping, in addition to his importance as a political leader, has also gained philosophical relevance. He has updated the thinking on “socialism with Chinese characteristics” which, in his view, is a continuation of Marxism-Leninism adapted to the Chinese reality of the 21st century, and is based on centralisation around the CCP, a pragmatic economic approach, nationalist characteristics and elements of Confucianism. A major project of this period is the Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013: a global infrastructure project connecting China to various parts of the world. It includes the construction of roads, railways, ports, and airports in several countries, with the aim of facilitating trade in Chinese products and strengthening diplomatic relations with countries on all continents, mainly in Asia and Africa. More than 150 countries, accounting for 60% of the global population, have joined this project; with a more pragmatic stance, Brazil has not yet joined. The Belt and Road Initiative is a point of geopolitical tension with the US, which is trying to pressure China through tariff measures and global infrastructure projects. Competition in the high-tech field, such as 5G and semiconductors, is another area of dispute between China and the US in recent years.
• In our characterisation, China is neither socialist nor a project on the path to socialism. It is a capitalist society, but with a more decisive role for the state when compared to Western capitalist countries. We could speak of a statist capitalism, which combines an authoritarian single-party government (of a self-proclaimed “communist” party) – which, even so, provides certain instances of participation at the subnational level – with a capitalist economy with significant state participation and control. Social classes continue to exist, as do the different forms of domination that constitute them, including the exploitation of labour. The Chinese economy is planned, with hegemonic participation by state property, and its financial system is also state-controlled. The government has greater control over domestic and foreign investment, as well as over the national development project. Even so, it is completely unreasonable to consider China socialist simply because its economy is more state-controlled and/or because it is subject to the rule of a self-proclaimed communist party.
• Russia’s re-emergence came with the overcoming of the political and economic crises of the 1990s, following the end of the USSR. With Vladimir Putin’s rise to power and subsequent consolidation of his position, Russia regained its economic strength – based mainly on natural resources (oil and gas), the military industry and trade with Asia (especially China) – and its international political and military ambitions. Between 2000 and 2013, it multiplied its GDP by almost nine times, even though it faced crises in the subsequent period. Such growth, despite lifting many people out of extreme poverty and improving the living conditions of the population in general, was achieved through widespread labour exploitation and a highly unequal distribution of wealth and income. Currently, there are more than 350,000 millionaires and a hundred billionaires (both in dollars) in the country. From a political point of view, Putin’s Russia has been characterised as a nationalist and authoritarian government, marked by control and repression of the opposition, gender-sexuality dissidents and the media. The country has seen a large increase in its military budget – between 1999 and 2012, it multiplied more than 12 times – which has restored its social force on the global geopolitical stage. The conflicts in Chechnya (2000-2009), the annexation of Crimea (2014), the intervention in Syria (2015), and the current war against Ukraine (2022-) highlight the military strength of this power, which is regaining its place in the contemporary world.
• Russia is also characterised as a country of statist capitalism, in which the state plays a more decisive role than in the more (neo)liberal societies of the West, although this role is less decisive than in China. It combines a government that concentrates power in the executive branch – notably since 2000, with Putin in power – with a capitalist economy under significant state control. It is a country moving towards economic nationalism and consolidating itself as a bastion of global (neo)conservatism. During the 21st century, Russia has been aspiring to form a national bourgeoisie which, under the direction of a centralised bureaucracy, is capable of rivalling Euro-American economic capital. It has also strengthened the Orthodox Church and nationalist and fascist movements, promoting a harsh confrontation with feminism and the LGBT+ community. Currently, the Russian government sponsors and supports religious fundamentalist movements and far-right parties in several other countries, including Germany, France, and Hungary.
• China and Russia have currently reconfigured the so-called Eurasian chessboard, working to build a multipolar world order and a counterpoint to US hegemony and NATO expansion. The main international tool for this has been BRICS – a bloc formed in the 2000s by these two powers, along with Brazil, India and South Africa, which later integrated other member countries and partners. Undoubtedly, BRICS has great economic strength, although it is not clear how much conflict its members are willing to engage in against US imperialism – for example, in the case of replacing the dollar for transactions between countries in the bloc. Even though there have been geopolitical advances in the projection of BRICS’ interests, in military terms there is also no evidence of interest in more coordinated and offensive operations to confront NATO. Despite this, there is a certain consensus that the United States’ virtually absolute hegemony in the world has come to an end and that we are moving increasingly towards a scenario with traces of multipolarity. It is true that the most powerful countries in the bloc, China and Russia – like any powerful state – have imperialist tendencies (and certain local and regional practices). For example, let us recall China’s role in the South China Sea, with impacts on the peoples of Vietnam and other nationalities, and in the process of “Hanification” (a policy of displacement or encouragement of migration of citizens of the Han ethnicity, China’s majority group, to regions inhabited by ethnic minorities), with impacts on the Tibetan, Uyghur and Mongolian peoples. Let us also remember Russia’s role in the Caucasus and in the suppression of popular rebellions with geopolitical justification (“rivalry with NATO”), impacting Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and even Ukraine.
• However, from a global perspective, it does not seem appropriate at this time to speak of an international conflict between two ‘imperialist’ countries/blocs. This is because, to date, the United States continues to maintain its imperial hegemony in the world, due to the social force (economic, political, military, cultural, etc.) that it has been able to mobilise internationally. But it is also important to bear in mind that, in this analysis of global imperialism, we cannot limit ourselves to political and military aspects; it is essential to consider economic aspects. This means that China, even though it is not as aggressive and interventionist internationally as the US, and despite not currently resorting to overt military force, has been growing significantly in global economic strength. Fundamental to this have been the countries to which China exports its capital and imposes high rates of labour exploitation; countries in which China creates relations of domination through financial loans and where it appropriates land (especially in Africa and Latin America). Finally, it is also important to note that this conflict between the US and China (Russia, BRICS, etc.) is not a contradictory conflict, so it may be capable of bringing about changes, but not transformations that break with the systemic logic of global capitalism-statism.

NEOLIBERALISM, TRANSNATIONAL OLIGOPOLIES AND GROWING INEQUALITIES

• In the years analysed, global capitalism-statism was profoundly marked by progressive urbanisation and intense technological development. Since 2008, the global population living in rural areas has been surpassed in number by the population living in cities; in 2023, the latter represented 57% of the world’s population. This increasingly urban society has benefited from automation, computerisation, new energy sources and biotechnology, which marked the third industrial revolution (Technical-Scientific Revolution). More recently, the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence and robotics have marked the fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0). In the geo-economic and geopolitical context already discussed – which implies, on the one hand, the dominant hegemony of the United States and, on the other, the growth of the social force of the China-Russia bloc (and BRICS) – Asia has been gaining more importance than Latin America.
• An essential feature of this period was the rise of neoliberalism. With the crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian model – marked by falling profit rates, difficulty in growth, rising unemployment and inflation – and in the context of the two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979, this new model of capital accumulation emerged. Economically referred to as ‘Toyotism’ or ‘flexible accumulation’, it was, in short, the project of the European and American ruling classes to re-establish their class domination and their appropriation of national and international wealth – a project whose social force overwhelmed that of the social democratic alternatives that had dominated in the previous period. Neoliberalism rose to prominence between the 1970s and 1980s in different countries. In Latin America, it was pioneered as an economic project in the context of the military dictatorship in Chile; in Europe and the United States, it soon became a more ambitious project under Reagan and Thatcher. It consolidated itself throughout the 1980s as a model of society formalised in the Washington Consensus, with economic, political and cultural ramifications.
• From the 1990s onwards, with the end of the Cold War, neoliberalism established its global hegemony. Through a discourse of efficiency and reduced state intervention, what we saw in neoliberal practice was a policy that merely redirected state resources and policies towards the ruling classes, particularly those in the core countries. It was literally the privatisation of profits and the socialisation of losses. Neoliberal policies of economic liberalisation and deregulation, austerity, financialisation, privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and flexibilisation of labour relations had dire consequences for workers around the world. And even though, along with other causes, the effects of the 2008 crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic have highlighted its limitations – with some analysts even declaring its end – there is no doubt that neoliberalism played a central role in the years in question, with two of its consequences standing out.
• The first was the immense internationalisation and concentration/centralisation of capital, which produced an ultra-monopolistic capitalism-statism, based on extremely powerful transnational oligopolies, which were reinforced by the privatisation of state-owned companies. To give you an idea, 1% of companies – mostly financial institutions such as Barclays Bank, J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs – control 40% of the global corporate system; sixteen groups control almost all commodity trading in the world – that is, the prices of these primary products, such as those that constitute the core of Brazilian exports, are not established by ‘market laws’, but by the economic and political power and speculative interests of these corporations. These oligopolies, which call themselves the “market”, dominate access to the world’s most important raw materials and manage gigantic budgets: in 2013, they controlled US$ 50 trillion, while, by comparison, the US GDP was US$ 17 trillion. Decisions about the destination and management of this economic capital, which is permanently mobilised for the accumulation of its owners, have no popular participation or transparency. It is a true dictatorship of the international bourgeoisie made possible by its possession of capital.
• This complex network of oligopolies wields immense political, legal and cultural power. It acts through lobbying, financing election campaigns, co-opting the justice system, and controlling information, education and scientific knowledge production. It acts to transform the interests of the ruling classes into “general interests” – for example, when it sets criteria such as “financial profitability”, “fiscal responsibility”, and “market confidence” as primary objectives to be achieved by national economies. This network acts constantly, in all fields, to protect and maximise its profits and properties; to intensify the exploitation of labour and ensure a permanent level of unemployment in order to control wages and trade unions; to maintain its tax and fiscal privileges, avoiding payments or receiving incentives; to ensure the opacity of its business, complicating inspections; to preserve the deregulation of tax havens; to shield its shareholders and administrators from accountability in cases of environmental and labour violations.
• The second serious consequence of neoliberalism was the brutal growth of social inequality. What we saw from the 1980s onwards was an unprecedented enrichment of the ruling classes and a general impoverishment of the oppressed classes in various countries, considerably increasing the economic gap (wealth and income) between them. Since the early 2000s, the richest 1% of the world’s population has owned more wealth than the remaining 99% combined. In 2017, eight individuals owned the same wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population. The worst thing is that this inequality continues to increase; the rich have become richer and richer, and the poor have become poorer and poorer.
• The transnational ruling classes have seen their wealth increase exponentially due to financial speculation, the distribution of profits from large companies, tax evasion (both legal and illegal), and extraordinary bonuses and salaries for managers and administrators. Between 2008 and 2024, the number of dollar billionaires rose from 1,125 to 2,781, and their accumulated wealth more than tripled, reaching over £14 trillion last year. This concentration of wealth is so great that it cannot even be consumed, and ends up functioning only as a mechanism to generate more wealth and power. A 2016 Oxfam survey found that 89% of billionaires that year were men and most of their wealth came from inheritance, favouritism and nepotism.
• Through their labour, the oppressed classes internationally ensured the enormous growth of global GDP, which multiplied more than eightfold between 1985 and 2023, reaching US$105 trillion last year. During this period, there was a steady increase in productivity and labour exploitation, as well as greater flexibility and precariousness in labour relations – particularly in recent years, with the advent of apps and platforms such as Uber, etc. In addition, there have been increasing losses of rights, as well as constant and significant wage losses, affecting hundreds of millions of workers due to the lack of inflation adjustments. In terms of jobs worldwide, agriculture is employing fewer people, services are employing more, and industry remains relatively stable. Between 1991 and 2022, jobs in agriculture fell from 43% to 26% of the population; jobs in services rose from 35% to 50%; jobs in industry went from 21% to 24% – even though many countries are experiencing a decline in manufacturing, whether they are central countries – such as the US, the UK, France, and Germany – or peripheral countries, such as Argentina and Brazil. Among the countries that have industrialised in recent years, the most important case is undoubtedly China. During the same period (1991-2022), global unemployment grew by more than 62%.2 In recent years, it is estimated that more than 800 million people worldwide are going hungry and 50 million are victims of modern forms of slavery. Since 2008, there has been a very high level of household debt, which continues to rise.
• In recent decades, the growth of organised crime can be understood as a direct consequence of the gaps left by neoliberal globalisation in various regions of the world. In many contexts, especially in marginalised communities, criminal organisations have filled this vacuum by offering alternatives for survival, such as informal jobs, social assistance, and even parallel power structures that, in some cases, are more effective and immediate than state institutions. Traditional criminal organisations, such as the Italian Cosa Nostra, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Chinese Triads, have coexisted and adapted to this new scenario; at the same time, new groups have emerged, such as the Latin American cartels and the Russian Bratva. The Bratva, for example, emerged with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the institutional collapse to structure and expand its illicit operations, often with the connivance or even support of political and business figures. This environment of state fragility is also fertile ground for the strengthening of transnational organised crime networks, operating as part of the global market for goods and services. Today, about 83% of the world’s population lives in countries with high levels of crime, with the proliferation of activities such as human trafficking, arms trafficking, prostitution, synthetic drugs, counterfeit medicines, and illegal mining. Illegal trade by organised crime generates more than US$ 2 trillion annually, with drug trafficking accounting for a considerable share of that sum, US$ 320 billion.
• In the 1980s and 1990s, the US-led “war on drugs” led to increased militarisation in the fight against drug trafficking, with profound impacts in Latin America, especially in Colombia and Mexico. Under the justification of eradicating drug trafficking and dismantling cartels, the United States promoted policies of violent repression, financing governments and security forces to confront criminal organisations. However, this strategy had devastating side effects: the strengthening of paramilitary groups, the expansion of violence, and the transformation of drug trafficking into an even more decentralised and resilient phenomenon. Furthermore, there are strong indications that the CIA itself maintained ties to drug trafficking during this period, facilitating the transport of narcotics to finance clandestine operations, as in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s. The CIA’s involvement with Nicaraguan traffickers linked to the right wing allowed large quantities of cocaine to enter the United States, resulting in a significant increase in crack use, mainly among the most marginalised sectors of society. Figures such as Daniel Noboa (Ecuador), Nayib Bukele (El Salvador) and Javier Milei (Argentina) have gained ground by adopting tough rhetoric against crime, promising policies of massive repression and tougher penalties as a solution to the advance of drug trafficking and crime. Ecuador, which until a few years ago was seen as a transit route for narcotics, has become a centre for drug distribution, storage and processing. This growth in criminal activity has led to an unprecedented escalation of violence; comparing the figures for this country in 2019 and 2023, homicides have increased more than sixfold. This dramatic increase is directly linked to the growing presence of Mexican cartels and local criminal groups vying for control of the territory. Daniel Noboa’s government has responded with emergency measures, such as declaring states of emergency and military operations, following a similar line to that of Bukele in El Salvador.
• Economic difficulties – along with other events involving wars, conflicts, persecution and natural disasters – have driven immigration, especially to the United States and European Union countries. Compared to recent decades, there is currently a significant upward trend in immigration in general – which reached 280 million worldwide in 2022 – and illegal immigration in particular, which accounts for around 20% of total immigration. In many places, immigrants occupy precarious, low-value jobs and have been the target of discrimination and xenophobia, often blamed for increased crime and the overburdening of public services and social programmes. At the same time, they are victims of conspiracy theories that portray them as internal enemies serving foreign interests. Obviously, all immigration, including illegal immigration, is legitimate and fair, as the vast majority are oppressed people seeking to improve their living conditions, often in the imperialist countries responsible for the precariousness of their previous lives. In general, illegal immigration to the US is mainly from Latin America, while immigration to Europe is mainly from Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In the US, illegal immigration more than tripled between 1990 and 2007, reaching more than 12 million people in the latter year; in subsequent years, this number decreased slightly. The vast majority (more than one-third) of these immigrants come from Mexico and are part of the US workforce; a minority come from India, China, the Philippines and El Salvador. The US has the largest prison population in the world, and Latino immigrants make up a significant portion of inmates. In 2014, about 59% of people in state or federal prisons belonged to ethnic minorities, with 37% being Black and 22% being Latino – meaning that 3% of all Black men and 1% of all Latino men were incarcerated. In Europe, between 2014 and 2017 alone, illegal immigration increased by 30%. It is estimated that in 2017, the number of these immigrants was between 3.9 and 4.8 million. In 2019, of all illegal immigrants who entered Europe, 30% were from Asia (mainly Afghanistan and Pakistan), 21% were from the Middle East and North Africa (mainly Syria and Iraq), and 17% were from sub-Saharan Africa (mainly Nigeria and Eritrea), with 32% coming from other countries in Europe and the Americas. From the 1990s onwards, illegal immigrants from countries such as Turkey, Morocco, Somalia, Egypt, and Algeria also became quantitatively significant. In Europe, immigrants are the main victims of human trafficking and modern slavery – in 2017, there were about one million people in this condition in the European Union alone, almost half of whom were women subjected to prostitution and sexual slavery.
• The consequences of neoliberalism are not only social. In contexts of high stress levels and lack of social ties, neoliberalism has also had an impact on the mental health of the global population, albeit in a very heterogeneous way. Some regions have been more affected than others, and women have been more affected than men. Two illnesses are particularly noteworthy: anxiety and depression. Between 1990 and 2019, the former grew by 5% and the latter by 11%; however, what stands out most is the increase that both experienced with the pandemic. Between 2019 and 2021 alone, anxiety grew by 20% and depression by 15% worldwide. In 2021, it was estimated that 4.4% of the world’s population had anxiety disorders (Portugal, Brazil, Paraguay, and Iran at the top of the list) and 4% had depression disorders (Greenland, Tunisia, Greece, and Palestine at the top of the list). Other mental illnesses related to capitalism – more specifically to the concept of female beauty that it promotes – are eating disorders: anorexia and bulimia. Although much less relevant quantitatively, they affect many people: 0.2% of the world’s population – the vast majority of whom are girls and women.
• However, it is also important to highlight another relevant factor in the growth of mental disorder diagnoses: the role played by the pharmaceutical industry and sectors of the medical camp in expanding what is considered pathology. Often, lobbying by these industries influences changes in diagnostic criteria and promotes the medicalisation of behaviours previously considered part of normal or varied human experience. The creation of new categories of disorders or the relaxation of clinical parameters can contribute to artificially inflating the numbers and, at the same time, expanding consumer markets for psychotropic drugs. This fact does not deny the real suffering of millions of people today, especially in a context of widespread social crisis, but it does alert us to the need to criticise the excessive use of diagnoses and drugs as the only response to psychological distress, often ignoring its social, economic and political roots.
• If, on the one hand, there is no doubt that between 1985 and 2024 neoliberalism was a central aspect of global society, on the other hand, it seems undeniable that the scenario is currently changing. Three significant events may be heralding such changes: the limits of neoliberalism itself, evidenced by the 2008 crisis, whose effects have not yet dissipated, as well as by the pandemic; geopolitical changes, due to the rise of the China-Russia bloc and the relative weakening of US hegemony; the strengthening of the far right, particularly in its anti-liberal expressions.

LIBERAL CONSENSUS AND LIBERALISATION OF THE LEFT

• In recent decades, the rise and consolidation of neoliberalism, coupled with the collapse of the former socialist bloc and the global hegemony of the United States, has produced crises in several countries that operated with the more traditional dichotomy between right and left. This is because a certain “liberal-democratic consensus” has established itself as the only alternative, combining, in economics, the capitalist market and its mechanisms (as something necessary and inevitable), and, in politics, principles such as multiparty electoral competition, universal suffrage, and the separation of powers. Although this notion of democracy can and should be questioned – among other reasons, because it ignores international relations, the economy, and distances workers from the most relevant day-to-day decision-making processes – the fact is that this liberal consensus directly affected left-wing parties in several countries.
• The more radicalised ones were stigmatised on the grounds that real experience had made it clear that socialism and communism were unviable; they had “gone wrong”. Many of these parties isolated themselves, ceased to exist, or adjusted to more moderate, reformist agendas. There were many such cases, such as the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh), the continuations of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB). Those that were less radicalised but still operated close to a more classic social democratic or labour perspective – fighting for welfare state – moved towards the centre, progressively adopting liberalising or even liberal perspectives. Here, too, there were many cases, such as the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Social Democratic Party of Sweden (SAP), the Labour Party of Great Britain, the Concertación of Chile, and the Workers’ Party (PT) of Brazil.
• From the 1990s onwards, this movement towards liberalisation by most of the world’s left-wing parties became evident; they shifted towards the centre and, in most cases, ended up abandoning not only revolutionary perspectives, but even structural reformism in favour of the oppressed classes. Alliances moved towards the centre (or even the right), reinforcing broad fronts – especially from the 2010s onwards, with the growth of the far right. On the occasions when ‘communism’ and ‘socialism’ remained in the names of these parties, they completely lost their content. Increasingly social-liberal, and at the most progressive (neo)liberal, this “left” has repeatedly reinforced that there is no alternative, and that what remains is to negotiate, manage barbarism, and try to achieve some improvement in the midst of it all. This “left” is increasingly docile and guided by civic and republican good behaviour, uncritically defending the “democratic game” and the institutions of order. Once again, this confirms what anarchists have historically pointed out: electoral competition by socialists, communists, etc. leads to bureaucratisation, moderation, the abandonment of principles and the betrayal of oppressed workers.
• Due to its prominent position in the world, the US has contributed significantly to this process. This is partly due to the role played by the Democratic Party, which has become less Keynesian and more neoliberal since the 1970s. Or through the role that its foundations (such as the Open Society Foundations, Ford Foundation, and Rockefeller Foundation) played in financing and stimulating NGOs, research groups, think tanks, parties, and progressive movements around the world. This is evidence of manifestations of neocolonialism that often claim to be ‘decolonial’. But there were also significant contributions from France, through the participation of several of its intellectuals, generally linked to post-structuralist thought, in the creation and international dissemination of the “postmodern turn“.
• Postmodern theories had their first major boost during the 1970s, in a context of declining popular struggles in France following the defeat of the May 1968 mobilisations. They later gained strength, with contributions coming mainly from countries in the global North, notably the United States. This postmodern turn, while criticising problems of the classical left – many of which were real and needed to be addressed – ended up producing something much worse, as it led to liberal or liberalising theoretical and political approaches; a post-Enlightenment form of liberalism. Postmodernists, in criticising scientism and instrumental reason, ended up denying science, reason, truth, and encouraging relativism, fragmented narratives, and the predominance of emotions. By criticising theoretical dogmatism and universalist and objectivist determinism, they ended up denying the need for robust social theories and the universal and objective aspects of reality and social struggles, and encouraging fragmentation and theoretical eclecticism, particularism and subjectivism. By criticising vulgar materialism and exclusively macrosocial conceptions of power, they ended up denying the materiality of life, structurally transformative political action – and, with that, socialism itself – and encouraging culturalism, the replacement of reality with discourse, individualism, if not nihilism and conformism. By criticising class determinism, they ended up denying the class perspective of analysis and intervention in reality, and encouraging particularisms and competing identities – of gender, sexuality, age, race, ethnicity, nationality, ability, etc. – separated from the class struggle, that is, a cultural identitarianism that, among other things, focused on sectoral and individual changes, the search for representation, and insertion through consumption. In short, postmodern positions are not only incapable of explaining reality, but also of transforming it in the direction of socialism. It is worrying that they have spread, over the years analysed, in various sectors of the left around the world.
• These two elements – the adoption of liberal-democratic consensus and the spread of postmodernism – were important in this liberalisation of the party left, whose impacts were and continue to be devastating for the global left in general. This is because, on the one hand, this liberalisation has spread to other areas, including popular movements, universities, the third sector and broad sectors of society; on the other hand, it has distanced the left from the oppressed classes and the class struggle, subjecting it to the growing prominence of academics, public figures, internet influencers, etc. Over the last few decades, the Democratic Party, foundations, and other institutions, mostly from the global North, have continued to encourage and finance liberalising initiatives that have distanced the left from its socialist and more radicalised perspective. This “left”, especially in its party expressions, has been increasingly distancing itself from the concrete agendas of the vast majority of the oppressed classes and increasingly adhering to an agenda whose impact is limited to the middle, intellectual, and artistic sectors. This political vacuum in relation to workers has been filled by the far right. As a result, this “left“, in practice, adopts increasingly liberalising policies, but tries to compensate for this with rhetoric that has little impact on social reality. There is no shortage of examples. Unable to effectively combat the precariousness of work, racism, patriarchy, and to build alternatives of socialising popular power, this “left” begins to talk about social entrepreneurship and individual empowerment; it begins to dispute the terminology used to refer to black people, the LGBT+ population, etc.; it begins to refer to Chinese capitalism as socialism or to adopt a radical internet discourse with no impact on reality. The cases are countless and can be seen both on social media and outside of it.

NEOLIBERAL CULTURE, KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEFS

• Neoliberalism also led to the spread of a neoliberal culture, which stood out throughout the years in question. Propagated as a type of rationality, this culture began to encourage neoliberal principles in all human relations and areas of social life. It promoted the progressive exaltation of competition (rivalry) between everyone, the personal pursuit of productivity and efficiency gains, individual accountability (“meritocracy”) and the treatment of others in terms of investment and valuation; individuals increasingly came to be conceived as consumers and social relations as commercial relations. As a result, the fragmentation of the social fabric was reinforced, solidarity was undermined, and collective projects were rendered unfeasible.
• However, in the cultural field, there are other milestones that should be mentioned. Possibly the most important in the decades analysed was the impact of the “digital revolution”, consolidated with the development and massive spread of personal computers, the internet, smartphones and social networks. This change began in the 1980s and has been consolidating throughout the 2010s and 2020s. Among many other aspects, it has completely changed the way people communicate and obtain information. Personal and group communication has accelerated greatly and facilitated interactions between people from the same country and abroad. Information has had a major impact, as online content has grown exponentially, the mainstream press has lost its hegemony, and other media have grown stronger. Between the 1990s and 2000s, blogs and initiatives such as Indymedia spread, democratising the media and allowing “ordinary” people and political activists to disseminate information in a more meaningful way. With smartphones and social networks, communication and information consumption have moved to the palm of our hands. Today, approximately 70% of people in the world have access to the internet and use social networks; there are almost as many smartphones as there are inhabitants on the planet. This has also reinforced the formation of bubbles, the spread of fake news and other related phenomena. Even so, social networks cannot be considered a world apart. As much as they have their own dynamics, they are part of society and not only reproduce what happens in other fields, but also have the ability to influence those fields.
• In terms of religion, according to data from 2022, Christians make up 32% of the world’s population, followed by Muslims (26%), Hindus (15%), those with no affiliation (14%) and others. Three global trends stand out. First, the growth that Muslims have been experiencing; in 1970, they were approximately 16% of the population, and in 2020, they reached 25% – the projection is that in the coming decades they will become the largest religion in the world. Second, the relative (percentage) decline of Christians throughout the global north; in 1910, they accounted for 87% of the population, and in 2010, 69%. Third, the changes that have taken place among Christians, particularly Protestants. Their numbers are declining in the global north and increasing in the global south, especially in Brazil, China, India, and Nigeria; in 2011, they represented 37% of Christians, compared to 50% Catholics, 12% Orthodox, and 1% others. In addition, since 1970, more fundamentalist positions have been emerging, especially among Christians (Protestants and Catholics), Muslims, Hindus, and Jews. And religious expressions more aligned with the left, notably Liberation Theology, are losing a great deal of ground. On the one hand, neoliberalism – by dismantling public services, social welfare networks and labour rights – has allowed religious movements to take over these functions. On the other hand, the crisis of the left has prevented trade unions, movements or other popular forces from challenging this process. It is also worth noting that the papacy remains a highly relevant geopolitical actor. The late Pope Francis expressed progressive positions on social justice, the environment and the reception of migrants; the current Pope Leo XIV (elected in 2025) continues this legacy within the limits of Catholic doctrine, maintaining the Holy See’s diplomatic influence on the international stage from a perspective close to the social-liberal left.
• In education, the years studied saw an increase in the number of people with access to formal education worldwide – from 75% of the population in 1985 to 87% in 2020. However, there are still many problems in this area, including: the structural situation of educational establishments; working conditions, salaries and training of teachers; privatisation and the penetration of the ‘market’ into the public sector; violence and the reproduction of class, gender and racial oppression. Scientific production has been growing in absolute terms, broadly in line with the increase in global GDP. However, this production is concentrated – 50% of it is produced by just six countries: the US, China, the UK, Germany, India and Japan – and has undergone geographical changes. Between 1996 and 2018, Europe remained at the top of this production, but between 2007 and 2008, second place shifted from North America to Asia. When analysing scientific production by country, we see that, although the USA remained at the top throughout the period analysed, in 2018 China, whose production grew 20-fold during those years, caught up with the USA. India’s production also increased significantly (7.5 times) during these years. Even so, the countries that currently have the highest percentage of PhDs and invest the most in knowledge are in the global north. Knowledge that, obviously, in most cases aligns with the interests of big capital and large states.
• Even with the considerable changes brought about by the “digital revolution” – which has led to fierce competition from alternative media and social networks – the mainstream press continues to have considerable relevance and impact around the world. The influence that owners and companies continue to have in different countries is undeniable: Rupert Murdoch (United Kingdom), Silvio Berlusconi (Italy), Televisa and Carlos Slim (Mexico), Globo (Brazil), Clarin (Argentina), five conglomerates (Japan), Vivendi (France), Bonnier (Sweden), Telefonica (Spain), Disney, Warner, Sumner Redstone, R. Murdoch, Bill Gates and Google (United States). Even with the internet and the democratisation it has brought in this area, ownership of such intellectual and moral assets (global media) remains deeply concentrated. On average, in each country, the four largest media companies control 79% of media platforms and 40% of media content. When evaluating not the existing possibilities for consumption, but the information actually consumed, this concentration becomes more than evident. Furthermore, even in this new internet market, monopolies have already formed, with companies such as Meta (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, etc.), Google, and Amazon reaching the top of the monopolistic companies.

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COLLAPSE

• From 1950 to 2024, the world’s population more than tripled, going from 2.5 billion to over 8 billion people. During this period, the world economy also grew immensely; in the last 40 years alone, it has multiplied more than eightfold, favouring above all the central countries and their ruling classes. This economic growth was driven by ever-increasing production of goods, due to the constant stimulation of infinite desires and increasingly globalised consumption patterns that are unattainable for the vast majority. For centuries, until the mid-20th century, the hegemonic view was that nature was an endless source of resources that should be used to promote human well-being. Especially since 1950, practices legitimised by this view, carried out by both the capitalist and socialist blocs, have led to a brutal increase in the destruction of the environment worldwide.
• The global ruling classes, through large transnational oligopolies, are the main protagonists of this global environmental destruction – a collapse, a crisis that threatens everyone. The evidence for this is abundant and the data is frightening. In environmental terms, climate change is possibly the most serious consequence, largely due to extreme events – hurricanes, heat waves, fires, droughts, floods – which are becoming increasingly frequent. From 1980 to 2024, the Earth’s average temperature rose by 1.5 degrees, and 2024 was the hottest year in history; sea levels are rising and glaciers are melting. More than half of all carbon emissions in history have occurred since 1990, with the United States and China leading the way, followed by the European Union countries, India, Russia, and Japan. In the last 60 years alone, global water consumption has doubled. With regard to the destruction of fauna and flora, as well as water and air pollution and land degradation, some indicators have shown some improvement since the 1980s, due to the global spread of environmental awareness. Even so, the figures remain alarming. Around 70% of the planet’s fauna was destroyed between 1970 and 2020, and 10 million hectares of forest are being devastated every year – Brazil stands out in this regard, alongside Bolivia, Peru, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Globally, around 2 billion people consume water contaminated by industrial and agricultural production and inadequate waste treatment. In addition, 40% of all soil on the planet is contaminated. In 2021 alone, air pollution contributed to more than 8 million human deaths. The forecasts for the future are catastrophic. In addition to the worsening of all the problems mentioned, there are other risks, such as the collapse of entire ecosystems, the growth of epidemics, diseases, hunger (due to increased food costs) and migration (due to the collapse of agriculture).
• Institutionally, a milestone in environmental issues was the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference, which sought commitments from heads of state regarding the emerging ecological agenda. However, the international bourgeoisie, especially those linked to the oil and coal sectors, began a reaction in the following years, promoting denialism that took hold in think tanks and conservative parties around the world. As environmental disasters accumulated, new international initiatives were launched, such as Eco-92 in Rio de Janeiro, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the 2015 Paris Agreement. But even these very moderate initiatives promoted by the UN failed. And they failed because of the interplay of global economic and political forces: the institution promoting these initiatives (the UN) responds to the interests of the bourgeoisie and global bureaucracy, which are the main protagonists of environmental destruction. The very model of these international agreements tends to fail, as it relies on the awareness and goodwill of big business and the world’s major states. Contemporary conflicts, which pit capitalist companies against states, notably the US and China, place even more obstacles in the way of these agreements, whose violation increases the chances of victory in conflicts. While it is true that there are sectors among the ruling classes that have concerns that go beyond the short term and are mainly focused on self-preservation in view of the imminent collapse, there are other sectors that have no intention of threatening their profits and immediate interests.

STRUCTURAL AND CONJUNCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

• Currently, global capitalism is experiencing a long period of economic crisis, with structural and cyclical elements. This crisis intensified in the 1970s and worsened significantly after the 2008 crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic.3 Some of the more structural elements of this economic crisis have already been mentioned, as they have been accentuated by neoliberalism: the concentration/centralisation of capital and the growth of social inequality. However, it seems important to make further comments on this crisis. In today’s society, there is a complete incongruity between economic production and distribution, which reflects a broader contradiction. This society has an enormous social capacity for the production of wealth – which, in fact, is achieved socially – but, given the power relations and the completely irrational way in which it has been organised, it promotes brutal inequality and unacceptable levels of precariousness, underemployment, unemployment and even hunger – since the appropriation of wealth is, in effect, individual. This situation is only reinforced by growing monopolies and technological development focused solely on the accumulation of economic capital. But even with such irrationality – without which it would be possible to promote significant growth/development, within ecological parameters, and reduce the amount of work done by the oppressed – in 2023, global GDP averaged R$ 21,000 (US$ 4,200) per month per family of four; and global grain and cereal production alone amounted to almost 1 kg per person per day. In other words, even today, within capitalist-statist irrationality, there is no rational justification, in terms of economic production or the amount of wealth produced, for poverty in the world.
• This situation persists due to social relations of power and domination, which benefit only a tiny group of rich and powerful people, the ruling classes. It is because a few have so much that so many have almost nothing. In recent decades, the global bourgeoisie has seen its profits increase significantly. And this has been happening at a faster rate than the growth in productivity and workers’ income. As a result, the trend is towards a progressive increase in poverty and social inequality. On the one hand, this inequality increases the level of domination of the oppressed classes; on the other, it limits consumption, given that wealth is finite and is reaching those at the bottom less and less. The threats of a worsening of this crisis remain constant.
• These aspects of the current capitalist-statist crisis cannot be solved through economic growth (“growing the pie”), international agreements, or state policies. With this global social inequality – in which those at the top appropriate almost everything and those at the bottom almost nothing – the level of growth necessary for any significant change in the living conditions of the oppressed classes is absolutely unfeasible, both from an economic and environmental point of view. As in the case of the environmental issue, international agreements, such as those signed at the UN, are systematically disregarded so as not to jeopardise national and class interests. Ultimately, states, even though they are subject to popular pressure, are structurally linked to capitalist interests; their function is to ensure the permanent accumulation and maintenance of capital. The vast majority of the bureaucracy is financed by big capital, defends its interests and enjoys this capital itself. Except in moments that require more serious measures to maintain order, the state does not intervene and will not intervene seriously to resolve this issue.
• However, the current crisis also has more cyclical elements that have been complicating the global economy since the 1970s. The process in recent decades has been as follows: the crisis deepens due to certain problems, whose solutions, always unstable and temporary, end up producing other problems and reinforcing the cycles of crisis, which occur at intervals of a few years. In the 1970s, the problem was inflation, which peaked in 1974, reaching 11.1% in the US and 13.1% in Europe. Attempts to solve it, which involved financialisation, monetarism, interest rate hikes and the destruction of trade unions, resulted in another problem. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, this problem was public debt – which, between 1980 and 1997, more than doubled and reached an unprecedented peak of over 80% of global GDP. Attempts to solve the problem – involving austerity policies, deregulation of private debt, increased private credit, privatisations and further neoliberal reforms – resulted in financial instability that led to the 2008 crisis, the effects of which are still being felt today. This crisis was the result of neoliberal financialisation and a direct consequence of the pursuit of private profits. But as usual, to mitigate the effects of the crisis, states bailed out the private sector of the economy by injecting money into banks and financial systems. In most cases, these expenditures were financed by issuing currency and reducing interest rates. Although public debt did not increase, private debt, both corporate and household, exploded. Central banks had their scope expanded and have been increasingly shielded from any popular intervention, even by elected governments. The consequences of the 2008 crisis were “socialised” among workers around the world, accelerating precariousness, unemployment, the falling of wages, of rights, and cuts in social policies. The main problem that resulted from all this was the enormous growth in social inequality, which was exacerbated by the pandemic and became a concern even for the institutions of the global ruling classes.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN CHECK AND THE RISE OF THE FAR RIGHT

• Even though, to this day, the majority of the world’s population does not live under liberal bourgeois democratic regimes, there is no doubt that the years of liberal consensus have caused it to advance significantly in the world, particularly in the West. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, this limited democracy has been in check, and has already seen a significant rise of the far right in Western and non-Western countries. We will refer to this right wing as the “far right” rather than fascist, neo-fascist, etc. Although there are similarities between it and historical fascism, we believe that the term “far right” avoids unnecessary controversy.
• As mentioned, neoliberalism led to a huge increase in the social power of transnational oligopolies and a massive widening of social inequality. Combined with the redirection of resources previously used to appease social conflicts – which existed mainly in central countries during Fordism-Keynesianism – these factors had consequences for liberal democracy in different countries. Oligopolies advanced not only in economic power but also in political power; they increasingly controlled political decisions and reinforced class domination. Bourgeoisies and bureaucracies worked actively to reduce popular participation in decision-making processes and to weaken workers’ organisations and movements around the world. As a result, the already very limited liberal democracy is becoming less and less democratic. Although formal rituals are maintained, relevant decisions are being transferred to the bourgeoisie and their oligopolies. In this movement, the relations between bureaucracies and bourgeoisies are being reconfigured. Elections themselves, which are also very limited in their ability to promote significant change, have become increasingly useless. In order to minimise the “risk” of elected governments sympathetic to workers, the ruling classes have been removing everything that is important to them from the scope of government decisions. Another factor in the loss of legitimacy of these democracies is the events that make it clear that, if there is opposition, even limited, to certain hegemonic interests, the will of the people may not be respected. This became evident in the 2015 debt referendum in Greece and in the new type of coups that took place in Latin America: Honduras in 2009, Paraguay in 2012, Brazil in 2016, and Bolivia in 2019.
• The context of recent decades – marked by environmental, economic and political crises, involving the crisis of the more traditional left; by the fragmentation of the social fabric; by the growth of Islamism and immigration (Latin American, Asian, Arab and African) to the US and Europe; the rise of feminist, LGBT+, anti-racist and ecological movements – has provided stimuli for the reorganisation and social strengthening of the far right, especially after the 2008 crisis. In other words, this right wing is, to a large extent, a reaction to the crises and changes of the last period. Although, in more specific analyses, it is necessary to make distinctions between leaders and grassroots, and about the different shades that mark the support of this right wing, it is possible to affirm that it has more general structural axes and more specific traits, which underpin political practices and permanent cultural wars, in addition to varying according to each context. One of these more general axes is the naturalisation of hierarchies and social inequalities, assuming that some humans are more ‘human’ than others, that each group or person has their rightful place in society and should remain so, that only the strong survive, etc. As a result, the far right creates an opposition between the ‘true people’ on one side – us, the superior, ‘good people’ who must be protected – and the ‘enemies of the people’ on the other – them, the inferior, the ‘parasites’, ‘rats’ or criminals who must be destroyed. This formation of “us” and “them” is deeply identity-based; collective identities are very strong unifying factors.
• Often, members of the far right present their positions as anti-systemic – “against everything that is there” or the old fascist “revolution in order” – even though they reinforce capitalism-statism. They conceive of an authoritarian project for society, as it presupposes domination at various levels, “law and order,” hierarchical discipline, and a single worldview. They make unrealistic diagnoses of reality, based on conspiracy theories, distorted analyses, and false information – a fact that has contributed to a comprehensive disintegration, reinforced by a sectarian spirit. As a rule, their conclusions hide the true contradictions of capitalism and the state. It has also been common for these members to adopt anti-intellectual positions and promote attacks on education and universities; for their diagnoses to reinforce their own self-victimisation, insofar as they judge the progress of the oppressed and social changes (real or imagined) as threats or oppressions of this “us” – thereby producing frustration, resentment and fear; that they advocate simple, emotionally charged and intolerant solutions to complex issues – solutions that, depending on the context, may combine xenophobic, ethnocentric, racist, nationalist, masculinist, misogynistic, homophobic, transphobic positions, etc.
• When, in the previous paragraph, we say “often,” “it is common,” and “depending on the context,” it is because this global far right is complex and diverse. It has shown a significant ability to adapt to different contexts and the distinct realities of each people, country, and region. In each circumstance, these hierarchies and inequalities are defined in a specific way. The “enemy of the people” may be Arab or Latin American immigrants, black people, Muslims, indigenous people, women, LGBT+ people, the “corrupt,” left-wing activists, etc. And the collective identity that brings them together may be national, ethnic, religious, cultural, but also gender, sexuality, and race. This right wing may be more closely linked to historical fascism and Nazism, or it may have more contemporary agendas and references. It can be (neo)liberal or developmentalist; it can support or oppose globalisation, the West, nationalism or religion; it can even be divided by religious or national rivalries, as in the cases of the conflict between Turkey and Israel and the war between Russia and Ukraine.
• This radicalisation on the right has found consistent support in several countries, among a considerable part of the bourgeoisie, bureaucracies and even the oppressed classes. There are leaders linked to this extreme right who have come to power through elections in different countries, including the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, Russia, Israel, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, India, the Philippines, Argentina and Brazil. However, this right wing has also expanded its social force through numerous movements and groups, which operate within and mainly outside the institutional framework of the state. This is the reality in the countries mentioned and in others, such as France, Germany, Sweden, El Salvador, South Africa and Japan. In the West, the leadership of this right wing is in American Trumpism, which has repercussions in countries in Europe and Oceania. In these regions, this right wing makes immigrants their great enemies and wins over white workers who feel abandoned by the parties. Some countries consider Russia an enemy, such as Italy and Poland, while others consider it an ally, such as France, Germany, and the United States. In Israel, where a racist and colonial apartheid regime against the Palestinian people was already in place, there has been a radicalisation of the right under the coalition led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who has decided to move towards an open and intensified policy of extermination. In Turkey, Recep Erdogan tightened his grip on power with the support of right-wing nationalists from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and turned the Kurdish people into a national threat. In India, Nerendra Modi became the representative of Hindutva, a fundamentalist far-right movement, and began to pursue policies of criminalisation and marginalisation of Muslim communities. In Latin America, the far right is more unified and acts as a transmission belt for Trumpism and under the influence of the Iberian right, especially Spain’s Vox and Portugal’s Chega. It has a moralistic, meritocratic discourse that mobilises populations against “corruption”, crime, and the rights of the poorest and minorities. In Brazil, the religious element is also prominent, particularly that of Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal evangelicals.

WOMEN, THE LGBT+ COMMUNITY AND PATRIARCHY

• Between 1985 and 2024, the material condition of women and the LGBT+ population worldwide makes it clear that the effects of patriarchy continue to claim victims and oppress them severely. However, it is also undeniable that progress has been made during these years, not only in the struggles surrounding gender and sexuality issues, but also in terms of effective achievements in various countries and around the world in general. During these years, issues relating to women and the LGBT+ community have been highly relevant in public debate and have had a growing impact on social reality. Those involving feminism stood out throughout the period analysed; those relating to LGBT+ activism have grown particularly strong since the turn of the century. However, it is quite worrying that the capitalist market and the state, through the ruling classes, have been trying to benefit from these issues. Worse still, since the rise of the far right, these very achievements are being threatened.
• In geographical terms, comparing the available indicators on the global condition of women, there is data to suggest that patriarchy manifests itself most harshly in North and Central Africa (in countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Nigeria and Somalia) and in the Middle East (in countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, Jordan and Yemen). It is less brutal in Nordic countries (such as Norway, Sweden, and Finland) and Western Europe (in countries such as the Netherlands and Switzerland). Similarly, data on the status of the LGBT+ community worldwide highlights that oppression of this population is extremely intense in North Africa and the Middle East. One country that stands out negatively in almost all assessments relating to women and LGBT+ people is Russia, which is deeply misogynistic and homophobic. Locations that are slightly more open, but where there is still a lot of prejudice and oppression, are: Western Europe, South America (in countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), Australia, and South Africa. The status of central or peripheral regions and countries, as well as cultural factors, including religion, help to explain this situation.
• Between 1991 and 2022, women around the world began to work more in the service sector and less in agriculture, following the general trend in global employment. However, in industry, which maintained its percentage of jobs, women went from 24% to 14% of the workforce. In other words, global industry has become more male-dominated. In the last decade, the areas in which women worked the most (paid and outside the home) were: care services, health, education, customer service, the public sector, retail and entertainment; unemployment among women remained stable during this period, at around 5%. In relation to unpaid domestic work, when compared to men, women performed almost three times as much work as men, according to data from 2023 – although it is important to note that this inequality has decreased slightly over the last ten years. This work, linked to caring for the family (children, the elderly and other relatives) and the home, is a cause of significant wear and tear, exhaustion and physical and mental illness, especially in the case of women who also work outside the home. Increasingly, women who care for others are in need of care themselves. These facts point to a double domination/exploitation of these women, both at work and at home. The regions with the greatest inequality in the performance of domestic work are North Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. The poorer the families, the more women are penalised. Data on the LGBT+ community worldwide show that, on average, around 10% of people are sexually dissident. In 2023, 3% were lesbian and gay, 4% bisexual and 3% of other sexualities. This 10% is the global average for countries that have much lower figures, such as Japan and Peru, each with 3%, and much higher figures, such as Brazil, with 15%.
• In recent decades, the cause of women and the LGBT+ community has been endorsed by bourgeois institutions at the international and national levels, which can be explained by the growth of progressive neoliberalism around the world. Internationally, over the years in question, the UN has promoted causes favourable to these social groups – important milestones were the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995, the creation of UN Women in 2010, and various policies focusing on human rights in general and the LGBT+ population in particular. Nationally, states sought to respond to these sectors of the population and update public policies. Many politicians realised that these niches offer many voting opportunities. In addition, the immense number of women and LGBT+ people – respectively, half and 10% of the global population – made many capitalist companies realise that it was possible to “engage” in gender and sexuality issues to increase their profits. To this end, the liberal approaches of feminism and LGBT+ activism, which guide the UN and progressive state policies, fit like a glove. Many companies began to adopt a discourse favourable to such causes, offering customised products and services to this audience, preaching consumption as a means of emancipation and eagerly competing for female money and “pink money”. Alongside these efforts, marked by almost entirely liberal approaches, the feminist and LGBT+ movements – with their plurality, which will be discussed later, but which brings together sectors ranging from liberalism to socialism – spearheaded demands and struggles, many of which were successful.
• The fact is that these initiatives – marked both by liberal positions linked to bourgeois institutions and by the struggles and movements of other political spectrums – had an impact on reality. In the years analysed, women saw their legal equality consolidated through bourgeois rights, such as property rights, inheritance rights and voting rights. They also witnessed considerable developments in state policies, such as institutional repression of domestic violence – which was practically non-existent in 1985 and, by 2023, was law in most countries – the prohibition of discrimination and wage inequality – between women and men for the same jobs – and maternity leave. Women also gained ground in state bureaucracy – including heads of state, ministries and parliaments – and in corporate structures of domination, including senior and middle management. The LGBT+ community also enjoyed certain bourgeois rights and state policies in their favour. The right that spread most internationally was legal permission for same-sex relationships; in 1985, it existed in 81 countries, and by 2024, it had spread to 133. The legal possibilities for same-sex marriage, adoption of children and, more recently, recognition of a third gender have also grown, albeit less significantly, since the 2000s. In general terms, this community has been receiving more sympathy from the population, particularly from younger people. With each generation, respect for the LGBT+ community has increased, as has recognition of different sexual orientations and gender identities. A 2021 study, which took into account 27 countries, showed – through a comparison between the “Boomers,” “Generation X,” “Millennials,” and “Generation Z” – that this respect and recognition are increasing among younger generations.
• Despite this, we understand that such bourgeois rights, state policies and, above all, the conquest of positions within structures of domination, need to be critically evaluated. This is because, while it is true that they demonstrate the social force gained by feminism and the LGBT+ movement worldwide during this period, it is also undeniable that their prioritisation and uncritical celebration highlight the hegemony of liberal approaches within feminism and the global LGBT+ movement. Firstly, it should be considered that these institutional advances are not always reflected in reality – because, in many cases, these laws are simply not enforced. Secondly, when these advances are not popular achievements, but government benefits, they do not contribute to the social force of the popular movement. Thirdly, there is also no gain for our strategy when more women or LGBT+ people become part of the ruling classes. It is worth remembering that, in our view, the path to the emancipation of women and LGBT+ people does not lie with the market or the state.
• Some data from 2024 show that, despite this slightly less unfavourable scenario, the situation of women around the world is still very harsh. Women earn on average 20% less than men for performing the same tasks; every 11 minutes, a woman or girl is killed by a member of her own family; one third of women have suffered physical or sexual violence from their partner, sexual violence from non-partners, or both; every day, more than 12,000 girls are at risk of genital mutilation; women have less than two-thirds of the rights enjoyed by men; 40% of women live in countries with restrictive abortion laws; 800 women die every day from complications related to childbirth; 270 million women do not have access to modern forms of contraception. The global situation of the LGBT+ community is no less worrying. In 2019, homosexual sex was punishable by death in Mauritania, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; in 2022, the majority of the population in many countries – including Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, China, and Russia – believed that homosexuality is never justified; in 2019, so-called conversion therapies (“gay cure”) were permitted in virtually all of Africa, the entire Middle East, and almost all of Asia. Finally, there is a threat of worsening this situation, putting even the aforementioned advances in check, due to the recent strengthening of the far right. The issue of patriarchy and the agendas of women, gender, the LGBT+ community and sexuality are fundamental and need to be addressed with due attention and through appropriate strategies and tactics.

RACIALISED PEOPLES, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND RACISM

• Analysing the material condition of all oppressed races and ethnicities in the world is an impossible task, given that there are countless peoples and that data and indicators about them are limited. In any case, it is impossible not to highlight that, over the last four decades, the condition of these racialised and indigenous peoples – or at least those who are best known – makes it clear that the effects of racism and ethnic oppression continue to victimise them severely. These effects are directly related to capitalism-statism, which, when it does not itself produce ethnic-racial tensions and domination, instrumentalises them, marginalising certain peoples to produce cheap labour and stimulate competition among workers. However, in recent years, in addition to much oppression, there have also been advances, both in public debate and in struggles, and even in achievements around racial and ethnic issues. Although it is important to recognise that, often, rights are not being fulfilled and state policies are not becoming a reality. As in the cases of gender and sexuality, ethnic-racial issues have been much more debated and have had a growing impact on social reality, particularly since the turn of the century. The capitalist market and the state, through the ruling classes and institutions such as the UN, are also seeking to benefit from these peoples, especially those that are more significant in terms of numbers. Similarly, the rise of the far right is jeopardising the advances that these peoples have made in recent years. The issue of racism and the agendas of racialised and indigenous peoples are also extremely important and must be addressed with the utmost attention and through relevant strategies and tactics.
• More generally, between 1985 and 2024, various peoples continued to be victims of ethnic and racial domination. These relations occurred on every continent and, in some cases, culminated in genocide. When discussing Brazil, we will speak more specifically about the condition of Black and Indigenous peoples, who are fundamental to our social formation. For now, we will go through some other cases that we consider significant in the years studied. In Oceania, Australian “aborigines” still have to deal with marginalisation and the expropriation of their lands, while the peoples of New Caledonia continue to claim independence from French colonial rule. In Africa, conflicts between armed groups in countries such as Sudan and Congo highlight the existence of power relations established during European colonisation, which continue to fuel ongoing wars. At the same time, the African diaspora continues to suffer countless victims of racism in various parts of the world. In the last 30 years, there have been at least two genocides in Africa: the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which Hutus murdered 800,000 Tutsis, Twas and Hutus during the civil war; and the genocide in Sudan, which began in 2003, in which the government and military groups murdered hundreds of thousands of Furs, Masalits and Zaghawas in the Darfur region. In Asia, the Myanmar government also carried out a genocide in 2017, murdering thousands of Rohingya and forcing nearly a million of them to flee abroad. In addition, various ethnic minorities, such as the Chechens and Uyghurs, have been fighting for their rights in countries such as Russia and China.
• In Europe and North America, racism has hit African, Arab and Latin American immigrants hard. Conservative, reactionary, neofascist parties and the far right in general are accusing immigrants of being responsible for the economic crisis and social problems. They accuse them of taking jobs away from the local population, increasing crime rates, overburdening and undermining public services and, in certain cases, of serving traditional oligarchies to destroy the national identity and Christian faith of Western countries. In Europe, this xenophobia was instrumental in the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union (“Brexit”) and has become the motto for reactionary organisations and groups in countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Poland. In the US, it has been a pillar of the Trumpist far right, with the implications already discussed above. However, this anti-immigration wave is also gaining momentum in peripheral countries, such as India – where the Modi government is stepping up attacks on Muslims and threatening the citizenship of nearly two million people from countries such as Bangladesh – and South Africa , where chauvinism against immigration from other sub-Saharan African countries, such as Mozambique, has been gaining ground.
• More specifically, there are three cases that stand out over the years evaluated, which highlight racism against racialised and indigenous peoples. These are the cases of the Palestinian and Kurdish peoples in the Middle East and the indigenous peoples of Latin America, which will be discussed below.
• The Palestinian people have a millenary history in the region currently occupied by Israel, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Ethnically, they are an Arab people with a cultural and religious identity largely linked to Islam, although there are also Christians and other minorities. Since 1948, the establishment of the Zionist state of Israel, based on colonialism and racism, has been killing and forcing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into exile. The 1993 Oslo Accords, achieved through Palestinian resistance, were violated by Israel, which maintained its blockade of Gaza. This led, in 2006, after the defeat of the Palestinian Authority, to a division of powers; the West Bank came to be governed by Fatah, the centre-left party of the Palestinian Authority, under Israeli tutelage; and Gaza came to be governed by Hamas, an Islamist organisation aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, under constant siege. In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, home to more than 3 million Palestinians, there is a violent military occupation accompanied by the construction of illegal Israeli settlements, which are advancing colonisation by expelling entire communities. In these territories, Palestinians face severe restrictions on movement; they are forced to pass through military checkpoints and have difficulty accessing workplaces, hospitals and schools. In Gaza, which has more than 2 million inhabitants, Israel continues to maintain a total blockade, in addition to military operations that daily bomb the region and murder Palestinians. Furthermore, the nearly 2 million Palestinians living within Israel are second-class citizens. Although they have Israeli citizenship, they are victims of the Zionist far right and do not have equal access to resources such as education, health care, and housing. In 2020, Israel signed the Abraham Accords with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, symbolising a distancing of Arab governments from the Palestinian population. In an attempt to halt this process, in October 2023 a coalition of Palestinian forces, composed of Islamist and Marxist organisations, launched a fierce attack against the State of Israel. This action triggered a brutal offensive by Israeli military forces in Gaza, which later spread to Lebanon, Syria and Iran. In just over a year, Israel has carried out a veritable genocide in the region; to date, direct and indirect deaths have reached 200,000 Palestinians, two-thirds of whom are women, children and the elderly.
• The Kurdish people are an ethnic group with a strong presence in the Fertile Crescent region of the Middle East. They are concentrated in a territory known as Kurdistan, which includes areas of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, with approximately 40 million people. The Kurdish people are mostly Muslim, with a religious diversity that includes Sunnis (the majority), Shiites, Alawites, Christians, and Yazidis. Their largest population is in Turkey, with 20 million people, who form a significant minority of the local population. In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), at the time inspired by Marxism-Leninism, began an insurgency against the Turkish government, aiming to establish an independent state. During the 1980s and 1990s, this government severely repressed the Kurds, pitting its military against Kurdish civilians and destroying their villages; the US and the European Union declared the PKK a terrorist organisation. Another Kurdish community of approximately 8 million people is located in Iran, where they also form an ethnic minority compared to the majority of Iranians, who are Persian. Between 1987 and 1989, in Iraq, the nationalist dictatorship, through the Anfal Campaign, carried out a genocide of the Kurdish population, with deaths reaching 100,000. After US interventions in the region in the 1990s and 2000s, Iraqi Kurds gained greater autonomy and established the Kurdish Regional Government, aligned with US and Israeli interests. Currently, these Iraqi Kurds number between 5 and 8 million people. In 2017, they held a referendum on independence for their territory, resulting in armed conflict with the Iraqi government, which was supported by Syria, Iran, and Turkey. In Syria, there are around 3 million Kurds, concentrated in a region known as Rojava. During the Syrian Civil War, which began in 2012 – when the PKK had already undergone political and ideological changes, consolidated in the mid-2000s, when it took on “democratic confederalist“ positions – the Democratic Union Party (PYD), aligned with the Turkish PKK, established an autonomous system of government, becoming the target of military attacks by the Syrian government and rebels linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda. In 2014, part of these rebels split off, creating Daesh or ISIS (“Islamic State”) and took territorial control of half of Syria and half of Iraq, investing heavily against Kurdish territories. The United States then began to collaborate with Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq, ensuring access to military resources and assistance. There is a strong possibility that the course of the Kurdish conflict will change, given that very recently (2025), Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, called on his party to lay down its arms and dissolve as an organisation.
• Despite the genocide they have been subjected to since the arrival of the colonisers, the indigenous peoples of Latin America continue to resist. These native peoples are ethnically very diverse and, in recent decades, several of them have gained visibility. In addition to those found in Brazilian territory, which will be discussed later, there are others that stand out. In the Andes, the Quechua, Aymara and Mapuche; and in Mesoamerica, the Maya, Zapotec and Nahuatl. The Quechua originate from the central Andes, with a presence in the current territories of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Argentina; they made up the majority of the Incas and their livelihood is based on agriculture, llama breeding and weaving. The Aymara are mainly concentrated in the current territories of Bolivia and Peru; they were part of the Tiwanaku Empire and have historically been engaged in agriculture, llama breeding and fishing. The Mapuche inhabit part of the current territories of Chile and Argentina; they became known for their resistance to the colonisers and their livelihood is based on agriculture, cattle breeding and weaving. The Maya originated in the current territories of Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, and Honduras; they traditionally devoted themselves to agriculture and architecture, producing cities, writing systems, calendars, and knowledge in astronomy and mathematics. The Zapotecs settled in what is now Oaxaca, Mexico; they engaged in agriculture, architecture and trade, developing cities and knowledge in astronomy and engineering. The Nahuatl concentrated in much of what is now Mexico; they formed the basis of the Aztecs and engaged in agriculture and trade, producing cities and articulating a military empire. Under neoliberalism, these and other indigenous peoples of Latin America have suffered from different forms of domination, including racism. Their territories and natural resources – such as timber, minerals and water – have been attacked due to the expansion of the agricultural frontier, illegal mining, large infrastructure projects and land grabbing. These peoples are victims of violence, including murder, assault, and threats, especially in cases of resistance – they still suffer from discrimination and acculturation. In practice, this scenario means not only the enormous precariousness of current indigenous lands, but also the expulsion of large indigenous contingents from their lands, forcing them to be exploited in the fields or cities and to live in poverty. Currently, there is a striking number of indigenous peoples without access to basic services such as water, sanitation and education, who suffer from child malnutrition, disease and the disruption of their ways of life, customs and values. In addition, disputes with drug cartels, which in some cases have alliances with large landowners, are also important in the territories of these peoples. This has led to armed confrontations for territorial domination on the one hand, and resistance and defence of the territory on the other.

OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA

• There are some additional comments on the medium-term conjuncture for the Middle East, Africa and Latin America that seem relevant to understanding these regions.
• In the Middle East, the central aspects of the period analysed are the effects of the “war on terror”, imperialist Zionism and the fate of relations between the various Arab political forces. The region was profoundly affected by the aforementioned “war on terror,” led by the US, which culminated in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq—and the subsequent fall of Saddam Hussein’s “Arab national” government—in an imperialist strategy justified by the hunt for former allies of Al-Qaeda. The most lasting effect of this movement was the authorisation of constant bombing of Islamised villages and remote areas. In Israel, Zionism became hegemonic among Jews, and left-wing integrationism, previously quite significant, lost much of its social force. Zionism advanced in its attempts at colonial/imperialist expansion and in its practices of racism. Despite this, Israel faced significant military defeats. Its fighters were expelled from Lebanon after 15 years (1985-2000) of a war of liberation led by Hezbollah and supported by Iran. In subsequent wars – in 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2024 – Zionist military forces won in terms of air supremacy, espionage and sabotage capabilities, but lost in ground combat. This was similar to what was seen in Gaza, where the formation of an autonomous Palestinian enclave lasted from 2005, when the Zionists dismantled their last colony, until October 2023, when they invaded the coastal strip by land. There were Zionist attacks in 2009, 2012, 2014, war in 2021 and, since October 2023, total invasion and genocide. The US has maintained unrestricted support for Israel and more than 30,000 military personnel in the region. Although support for the Palestinian cause is a consensus among Arab countries, it is almost always betrayed by the governments in power.
• During the years studied, there was considerable progress in the so-called “Axis of Resistance” – an umbrella of strategic alliances based in Iran, followed by central Shiism, anti-imperialist and secular Islamic forces against Zionism – and in air warfare capabilities, with the use of missiles, drones and satellites. There was also an intra-Islamic conflict, most prominent in Iraq and Syria, where Al-Qaeda and its Daesh/ISIS splinter group faced Shiite forces or multiple alliances (including Sunnis) against Salafism. The military campaign against Yemen was the ultimate expression of this fratricidal struggle manipulated by the West. Pan-Arabism was politically defeated, although it is still very popular among the Arab masses in large urban centres. The most autocratic civilian governments lost legitimacy with the Arab Spring. There is still a new alignment of petro-monarchies, with an increasing capacity for independent decision-making, starting with Qatar itself – its fund and the Al Jazeera network are instruments of soft power. Both the conversion of surpluses and economic sophistication are notable, especially in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its position as an Islamic power, entering the first quarter of the 21st century with an Islamist party in a central position – the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Turkish branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
• In Africa, neoliberal policies have resulted in a wave of social breakdown and impoverishment, exacerbated by devastating epidemics. Part of this situation stems from the aforementioned armed conflicts and genocides, which are not “tribal conflicts”, as the mainstream Western media would have us believe, but rather the effects of this complex situation, which worsened when, with the end of the Cold War and the demobilisation of armies, the weapons that were in African territory were divided among militias and criminal groups linked by ethnic kinship. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Ivory Coast and Somalia have all experienced intense civil wars. More recently, there has been a process of collapse of French protectorates in large regions of Africa and a revival of economic activity, with investments from China, Libya and South Africa. The formation of the African Union in 2002, with its 53 members, defined an economic and multisectoral action plan for the continent, and a pan-African diplomacy slowly emerged. Nigeria has emerged as the continent’s largest economy, rivalling French investments. The presence of China, Brazil, India, Russia, Cuba, Turkey and the Arab Gulf nations has intensified. In contrast, the US has been seeking to increase its presence in the region; it has recreated the Fourth Fleet, which operates in the South Atlantic, militarising the Sahara desert, treated as a a ”terrorist“ space, and the command known as Africom. That location has become another pole of dispute, with what has become known as the “new scramble for Africa”.
• In Latin America, the impacts of US imperialism and neoliberalism have been felt over the last few decades, despite institutional and extra-institutional resistance. More generally, this region has continued to be characterised mainly as a major commodity export platform, even when under left-wing and centre-left governments. Regardless of whether they leaned more towards regional or counter-hegemonic integration alternatives, or remained faithful to alternatives that maintained US tutelage, Latin American countries continued to live with reprimarisation, financialisation and the impacts of transnational oligopolies. During the last US administrations – George Bush Jr., Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden – US interventionist policies in Latin America remained in place, albeit in different ways; they were adjusted and readjusted, but continued to corroborate the neoliberal agenda for the region.
• Various forces opposed this situation. Among others, which will be discussed later, we would like to highlight two. The first, within the institutional sphere, was the so-called Pink Tide. This movement involved the election of left-wing and centre-left governments in different countries. In addition to the Lula and Dilma governments in Brazil (2003-2016), this wave included other governments with a similar profile: Néstor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina (2003-2015); Tabaré Vázquez and José Mujica in Uruguay (2005-2015); Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006-2019); Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007-2017); Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2007- ). A more advanced project during this period was the government of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1999-2013), which promoted a constitutional reform that implemented more profound changes in society, with the protagonism of the popular classes and nationalisation of the economy, in addition to a more explicit anti-imperialist position. On the other hand, the model was heavily dependent on oil, with centralisation of power in Chávez and state bureaucratisation. Chávez’s death highlighted the weaknesses of this process, which degenerated in the following period. These countries also sought, on several occasions, to strengthen ties with Fidel Castro in Cuba. At a certain point in the 2000s, almost all South American governments had this perspective. Except perhaps for the experience of Venezuela, these governments were not revolutionary; they were reformist or even less than that. Some were more moderate, others less so. They converged in their defence of greater sovereignty for Latin American countries, seeking a certain degree of regional rapprochement, and also in their defence of developmentalist policies and social programmes with some income redistribution. They benefited from a favourable international context, marked by high commodity prices, and some of them, such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, even nationalised strategic sectors such as oil and gas. Even with all the problems and limitations – including the maintenance of the dollar as the currency for international transactions, attempts at reconciliation with neoliberal policies, and “cultural Americanisation” within the countries themselves – and after a broad, combative and radicalised international resistance movement based on direct action in the streets, these governments limited US influence in the region, contributing to the defeat of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a project for the integration of Latin America into North America. These were advances, but they also showed the limits of bourgeois and bureaucratic institutionality. Faced with this scenario, the US modified its policies for the region and, from the end of that decade onwards, contributed to destabilising movements, lawfare practices and even new types of coups in Honduras (2009), Paraguay (2012) and Brazil (2016). The “Pink Wave” weakened in the second half of the 2010s, when the far right was already growing and riding the wave of neoliberal precariousness and social fragmentation which, even if mitigated, never ceased to be felt in these countries; and also when public opinion was manipulated through the mainstream media and social networks. A second wave of resistance occurred outside the institutional framework, with the so-called puebladas or estallidos sociales, popular rebellions led by socially organised and radicalised sectors opposed to neoliberalism, which succeeded in overthrowing anti-popular governments. Such were the cases of Abdalá Bucaram in Ecuador; Fernando de la Rúa in Argentina, with the piquetera rebellion; Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada in Bolivia, with the gas war. This became a new, more radicalised pattern of confrontation on the continent, replacing armed struggle as a tool for change and transformation.

WARS BETWEEN STATES AND CIVIL WARS

• Between 1985 and 2024, wars between states, civil wars and armed conflicts were intense throughout the world, claiming countless victims. They mainly affected the periphery of global capitalism, especially Africa and the Middle East, which accounted for most of the deaths. Many were influenced by the conflicts of the Cold War and US imperialism. During those years, deaths in such conflicts reached millions. In 1985, an estimated 230,000 people died in wars between states alone, excluding civil wars and other armed conflicts. In the 1990s and 2000s, this annual average declined, but from 2014 onwards it rose again. in 2022, it reached its highest level, with 270,000 deaths in that year alone. Thus, wars between states are currently killing more people than in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. Another noteworthy fact is the increase in the number of armed conflicts worldwide; between 1989 and 2023, they rose from 86 to 176 per year. In other words, we are currently experiencing an intensification of wars and armed conflicts.
• Among the most significant wars between states, a few can be mentioned. First, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), which involved political, religious and territorial disputes, mobilised several other countries, and ended with hundreds of thousands of deaths. Second, three other wars directly related to the aforementioned US Wolfowitz Doctrine, two of which were in the context of the “war on terror.” The Gulf War (1990-1991), in which a coalition led by the United States attacked Iraq with the aim of retaking Kuwait, which had been annexed. The Afghanistan War (2001-2021), in which the US, in the context of a civil war that had been going on since 1978, invaded Afghanistan shortly after 11 September 2001 and, after a costly occupation, left the country, which was immediately retaken by the Taliban. The Iraq War (2003-2011), in which the US invaded Iraq claiming the existence of weapons of mass destruction (something that was never confirmed) and occupied the region, leading to a civil war that devastated the country. Third, the War between Russia and Ukraine (2022- ), in which Russia invaded Ukraine, both for territorial ambitions and to respond to NATO’s advance in the region; the conflict continues at this time, with the US actively intervening. It should be noted that, in order to understand this war, three events from 2014 cannot be overlooked: the massacre in Odessa, the coup d’état that installed a neofascist government in Ukraine, and the resistance in Donbass (pro-Russia). With Trump’s recent (2025) re-election in the US, the course of this war may change, given his proximity to Putin and the possibility that the US will no longer continue to finance Ukraine. These wars highlight the United States’ efforts to expand its dominance to Eastern Europe, Western Asia and the Middle East, with an emphasis on its interests in oil and other resources in these regions.
• There have also been civil wars in different regions of the world. In the Middle East, there are three notable cases. First, the aforementioned Afghan Civil War (1978- ), which involved conflict between the mujahideen rebels and the Afghan communist government, the invasion by the USSR, and the rise of the Taliban, responsible for ethnic and religious oppression and which, after the US invasion in 2001, promoted an armed insurgency. Second, the Syrian Civil War (2011- ), which began with the government’s repression of the Arab Spring protests and polarised the country between the government, which has the support of Russia and Iran, and the rebels, who have the support of the US and Arab Gulf countries. Between 2012 and 2018, this war claimed nearly 400,000 lives and created conditions for the strengthening of Daesh/ISIS. Third, the Yemen War (2015- ), which has pitted supporters of the former government of Abd Hadi, including Saudi Arabia (Sunni), against the Houthi rebels (mostly Shia), who took over the government in 2014. In Africa, two other cases are worth mentioning. The first is the Civil War in Angola (1975-2002), which began with disputes following the country’s independence and was exacerbated by international interventions, many of which were motivated by interests in oil and diamonds, as well as ethnic and regional divisions. The second is the Civil War in Somalia (1991- ), which began with disputes following the fall of dictator Siad Barre and was exacerbated by ethnic (clan) divisions, which were exploited by international interests and agents; to date, this war has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. In Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav Wars (1991-2001) stood out, which took place in the wake of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and involved not only the independence of countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, etc.), but also ethnic and religious conflicts. In the midst of this process, in which tens of thousands of people died, there was the genocide of thousands of Bosnian Muslims by Serbian forces. Currently, these civil wars are having devastating effects in the Middle East and Africa. In these regions, different conflicts, particularly those based on ethnicity and nationality, when not directly produced and stimulated by imperialism, capitalism and states, are exploited by them to further their own interests.

CLASS STRUGGLE, POPULAR MOVEMENTS AND THE RESURGENCE OF ANARCHISM

• During the years analysed, the whole world witnessed social conflicts, movements and struggles involving a variety of issues. The class struggle was always evident, but it was not the only one, as we shall see below. Popular movements (trade unions and social movements) played a prominent role, and anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism and revolutionary syndicalism experienced a revival.
• Popular movements organised by workplace continued to rely on the relevance of trade unionism. However, it is important to note that, worldwide, the sector of workers organised and represented by trade unions is not very large and has been declining considerably. Although the global picture is very heterogeneous, there are some general trends. With the exception of a few countries with very high trade union representation, such as the Nordic countries, the general trend is towards relatively low unionisation rates. From 2000 onwards, this rate remained between 10% and 30% of workers in countries such as Argentina, Mexico, the USA, Spain, France, India, Australia, Egypt, South Africa and Japan. Furthermore, with the exception of a few countries where unionisation rates have grown, such as China and India, the general trend is downward. For example, in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, this rate fell from 32% in 1985 to 16% in 2019. In other words, workers are increasingly less represented by trade unions. Parallel to trade unions, urban and rural social movements emerged during the period under review, involving coordination by workplace and/or place of residence and/or place of study. These are movements that organise and promote struggles around issues such as housing, land rights, health, education, human rights, food sovereignty, public transport, gender, agroecology, race-ethnicity, etc. In certain cases, these movements acquired very significant mass bases – as in the case of Via Campesina, founded in 1993 by rural organisations; in others, they remained more fragmented, with smaller bases.
• In terms of political-ideological perspective and positioning in the class struggle, these movements are varied. Some trade unions have openly embraced the employers’ perspectives and even neoliberalism. Other trade unions, possibly the majority, have aligned themselves with social democratic and social liberal positions, supporting a trade unionism that is often corporatist, bureaucratic, reformist and partisan. This social democratic/social liberal position is possibly the most common in social movements around the world, which are also often bureaucratic, reformist and partisan. More radicalised, combative trade unions and social movements that effectively defend workers and their interests in the class struggle are in the minority. Within them, Marxism still has a significant influence. However, libertarian perspectives in general (in the sense of anti-authoritarian positions, whether socialist, communist, autonomist, indigenous, religious, etc.), and anarchism in particular, have gained increasing relevance.
• There is no doubt that, in recent decades, there has been a global resurgence of libertarian and anarchist ideas and actions around the world. This remains visible both in popular movements more directly linked to this perspective and in opposition and minority groups that are in trade unions and broader social movements disputing their lines. In our assessment, what seemed most promising in this resurgence was, at the social level, the strengthening of revolutionary and anarcho-syndicalist trade unions and union centres, as in the case of the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT) in Spain, and, at the political level, the growth of the platformist and especifista currents, as in the cases of the Federation of Anarchist Communists (FdCA) / Alternativa Libertaria in Italy and the Federación Anarquista Uruguaya (FAU) in Uruguay. These and other libertarian and anarchist currents influenced not only organisations and movements, but also the relevant struggles of the period. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that, even though they have grown significantly in proportional terms, with their membership multiplying several times over, libertarians and anarchists are still a small minority in absolute terms and when compared to other political forces. They need to grow considerably if they want to increase their influence in a more decisive way.
• This weakening of trade unionism does not mean that “the working class is dying out” or that trade unions are no longer a powerful alternative for workplace organisation. However, national realities vary greatly, both in terms of the correlation of forces competing for trade union membership and the impact of labour legislation. There are unions that are passive, combative, more or less bureaucratic. An important factor in understanding these different realities is the issue of union unity and plurality. In the years studied, unity prevailed in countries such as Brazil, Portugal, and Colombia; it requires that, in a given professional category and territorial base, there be only one legally recognised union to represent workers. Plurality prevailed in countries such as the USA, France, and Spain; it allows for the existence of multiple unions to represent the same professional category in the same territorial base. In these countries, anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists and revolutionary trade unionists advanced their trade union projects by taking advantage of this plurality, as it allows for the creation of trade unions with these positions, the progressive affiliation of workers aligned with them, and the representation and protection of these union members. Attempts to do this in countries with single unions have been problematic, particularly because of the impossibility for unions to represent their members in negotiations and protect them in cases of attacks by employers. In these countries, the formation of groups and oppositions to challenge the official unions, both at the grassroots and in the leadership, has apparently been more fruitful.
• It is true that trade unions bring together many more workers around the world than social movements. But it is also true that the former have many more problems and limitations than the latter. This is because, among other things, there are trade unions that openly defend the ruling classes, something that is much less common in social movements. Social movements have been key agents in the class struggle and other struggles in cities and rural areas. This is facilitated by the fact that they can be created and organised in a much less bureaucratic way than trade unions, and because they offer many more opportunities to go beyond labour issues and penetrate places of residence, study and others. Even so, these movements face risks linked to fragmentation and the loss of class perspective. What global experience seems to indicate is that, from our perspective, there are two possibilities: to participate in movements with broader popular bases – and, in this case, the greatest challenge will be the dispute over lines; and/or to create movements more aligned with our perspectives – and, in this case, the greatest challenge will be growth and rooting. Now, regardless of all this, we must never lose sight of the fact that the vast majority of the oppressed classes globally are not organised in trade unions or social movements.

FACING NEOLIBERALISM, AUTHORITARIANISM AND NATIONAL OPPRESSION

• In this scenario of international class struggle, the movements and struggles that confronted neoliberalism, authoritarianism and national oppression were remarkable.
• The destructive effects of neoliberalism on social and environmental conditions were combated throughout the period studied, through different types of mobilisation. In addition to the aforementioned Latin American uprisings, several others stood out. Possibly the most advanced and influential experience was the Zapatista Uprising in Mexico, which began in 1994 and was led by indigenous people from the state of Chiapas linked to the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN). This uprising combined the force of arms with a powerful grassroots democracy, autonomously managing 55 municipalities where hundreds of thousands of people live. Even amid enormous difficulties, notably state repression and the fight against drug trafficking, the movement remained steadfast and became a reference point for much of the global left. The Zapatistas were among those who, in 1998, founded Global People’s Action (AGP), a coordination of popular movements that spearheaded the “anti-globalisation” or Global Resistance Movement and the days of global action against neoliberal globalisation, which occurred with greater intensity between 1999 and 2002. This movement focused on massive transnational street protests, coinciding with events organised by major neoliberal institutions. Between 2006 and 2007, the so-called Oaxaca Commune stood out in Mexico, when the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) led conflicts and occupations against the government. After that, the 2008 crisis and its aftermath motivated a new cycle of mobilisations and struggles against the effects of this neoliberal crisis. This cycle began with the protests and revolts in Greece, which took place between 2008 and 2012 and denounced the effects of the public debt crisis and austerity policies through radicalised and combative street demonstrations, occupations of schools and universities, destruction and attacks on property. In this context, there were three other notable experiences. Between 2010 and 2012, there was the Arab Spring, which will be discussed further below. And in 2011, there was the Indignados movement in Spain and Occupy Wall Street in the United States. The Indignados or “15M” involved demonstrations, camps, and popular assemblies in different Spanish cities to discuss the impacts of the crisis, dissatisfaction with social inequality and institutional party politics, and to address issues such as housing, health, education, retirement, and corruption. Occupy was concentrated in New York and had a similar focus. It was based on demonstrations, camps, and popular assemblies against financialisation and social inequality; it harshly criticised the richest 1% in the world and coined the slogan “We are the 99%“.
• These experiences had great virtues. Within the already discussed context of “liberal-democratic consensus,” liberalisation of the left wing, and union bureaucratisation, these movements brought different positions to the fore. Not only did they harshly criticise neoliberalism in its social and environmental dimensions, but they also proposed radical forms of anti-capitalism; not only did they criticise representative democracy, but they also proposed radical forms of grassroots democracy. They united trade unions, social movements, groups and individuals who defended social ecology, food sovereignty, economic and political equality, local economic and popular alternatives, and cultural diversity. In other words, even in a complicated scenario – and under constant threat from the reformist and liberal left, which acted permanently to contain the mobilisations, if not to criminalise them – these experiences managed to promote more radicalised left-wing positions based on anti-capitalism, direct action, autonomy, and direct democracy. The Zapatistas, who began by claiming Marxism, took increasingly libertarian (anti-authoritarian) positions throughout the process, having a major influence on the revival of anarchism that occurred from the mid-1990s onwards. Anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists and revolutionary trade unionists were present and influential – in some cases, playing a leading role – in the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement and in the struggles that took place in Greece, Spain and the USA. However, these experiences also revealed limitations that have become apparent in this libertarian field, including: a lack of strategic clarity and a lasting long-term anti-capitalist project; the difficulty of connecting the big issues with immediate demands, and actions and protests with everyday grassroots work; the inability to structure organisations that were not closed in on themselves, that were capable of exercising grassroots democracy, self-management and federalism, and of mobilising and incorporating workers. The attempts to channel these efforts into conventional political parties were also problematic. Such was the case with Syriza and Podemos, parties founded in Greece in 2013 and Spain in 2014, respectively. Claiming to bring the demands of the streets to parliament and state policies, these parties quickly adjusted to the status quo and became retreating organisations, even from the perspective of structural reformism.
• Struggles with more specifically political perspectives also took place during these years. Many of them demanded and achieved redemocratisation, albeit within the framework of liberal democracy. Struggles in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to the end of military dictatorships in Ecuador (1980), Bolivia (1982), Honduras (1982), Argentina (1983), Brazil (1985), Uruguay (1985), the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1987), Taiwan (1987), and Chile (1988). Movements for redemocratisation also occurred in Asia and Eastern Europe, in the context of the crisis of the socialist bloc. Such was the case with the Tiananmen Square protests in China in 1989 and the protests in Serbia between 1996 and 1997 against the dictatorship of Slobodan Milošević. In transnational terms, the Arab Spring (2010-2012) stood out as a major movement of popular dissatisfaction against authoritarian and repressive governments, systemic corruption, lack of freedoms, and social inequality. In each country, it took on different political contours and outcomes and, in some cases, was used by imperialism and Western powers to channel the demonstrations to their advantage, with millions of dollars from US and European foundations, forming what were called “colour revolutions”. There were changes of government (Tunisia, Egypt), civil wars (Yemen, Syria and Libya), maintenance of the regime (Bahrain) and reversal of changes (Egypt). Despite the impact on regional power games – increasing the influence of powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Russia – the Arab Spring did not advance towards more significant experiences of popular power, nor towards socialising projects.
• National liberation, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles also took place during the years analysed, continuing the initiatives of previous decades. Decolonisation and independence movements continued to occur in Africa, Oceania, Asia and Europe. On the African continent, there were struggles that culminated in Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia between 1991 and 1993, a movement that, to a certain extent, continued the previous national liberation struggles that had taken place in Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Sudan. On the Oceanic continent, there was the struggle for New Caledonia’s independence from France between 1984 and 1988, and the Bougainville Revolution against Papua New Guinea and Australia between 1988 and 1997, making the Bougainville region autonomous. On the Asian continent, East Timor gained independence from Indonesian occupation in 1999. Independence movements were also present on the European continent. These included violent actions by existing groups, such as the IRA (Irish Republican Army), which sought independence from the United Kingdom and agreed to a peace deal in 1998, and the Basque ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), which sought independence from Spain and France and announced the end of its armed activities in 2011. As well as the confrontations of the Catalan people – who currently number approximately 7 million – with Spanish state oppression, which took place in the years in question and culminated in 2017. That year, there was a declaration of independence from Catalonia followed by a combative and massive cycle of struggles, which were harshly repressed by the state, received no support from social democrats or social liberals, and were the target of harsh attacks by the far right. Following a series of wars and revolutions against US imperialism – carried out in Korea (1955), Cuba (1959), Vietnam (1959-1975), and Nicaragua (1979)—other actions took place in Latin America that reconciled class struggle with anti-imperialism: the mobilisations that led to the overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti in 1986; the internal conflict in Peru and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and the struggle of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador – all of which took place between the 1980s and early 1990s.
• Such cases show that, on the one hand, this confrontation with military dictatorships, authoritarian governments, imperialism and neocolonialism continued and had a significant presence in the years in question. And that there is contemporary importance in the agendas of democracy and self-determination of peoples, both of which can be promoted in less and more radical ways, as well as international solidarity. Palestinians, Zapatistas, and Kurds, whose cases have already been discussed, have raised these banners – the latter two through perspectives that have anti-authoritarian traits. On the other hand, these cases also highlight the limits of both liberal defences of democracy, which focus on the mere replacement of regimes or governments, and nationalist positions, which abandon class struggle and internationalism. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the “liberal-democratic consensus” have apparently minimised, at least quantitatively, the mobilisations that opted for armed struggle. Since the early 2000s, there has been a major effort to institutionalise national conflicts.

CONFRONTING RACISM, PATRIARCHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION

• The movements and struggles that confronted racism, patriarchy and environmental destruction were also remarkable.
• The anti-racist struggles that have stood out in recent decades include those that took place within the context of previously discussed cases, such as the resistance of African, Arab, and Latin American immigrants against governments and the far right in Europe and North America. The black issue was present both in the struggles of immigrants and in other episodes of the period, of which we highlight two. The first was the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa, which achieved victory in 1994. It involved tireless resistance, mainly from the Black population, which included civil disobedience, street protests and more radical actions, such as armed struggle. It is true that this struggle, even though it ended apartheid, did not end racism, so other anti-racist struggles continue in that country. The second was Black Lives Matter, which took place in 2013 in the United States. The movement established itself as a platform for struggles against racism in general, and against police racism in particular, given that its own trigger, the murder of Trayvon Martin, was directly related to this. Noteworthy in this movement was the mass character it acquired, as well as its impact in other parts of the world; also striking was the culture of direct action and direct democracy that it incorporated and promoted. Its limitations were similar to those of the Global Resistance Movement and Occupy Wall Street. In addition, there were also conflicts between reformist and revolutionary positions, which were accentuated by nationalist and postmodern positions. In this context, although of little relevance, it is worth noting the resurgence of armed groups which, taking the former Black Panther Party as a reference, set out to reorganise resistance and confrontation against white supremacists and, at the same time, to highlight the need for self-defence among the black population and other minorities.
• The struggles against ethnic domination during this period include those already mentioned, as well as others. Among those mentioned, we draw attention to the heroic mobilisations of the Palestinian people against the colonialism and Zionist racism of the State of Israel, and of the indigenous peoples of Latin America against large landowners, leaders and gunmen from agribusiness and mining. The indigenous peoples of Latin America have been building popular organisations to catalyse grassroots work and mobilisations. We highlight, in Colombia, the National Indigenous Organisation of Colombia (ONIC) and its struggle against drug trafficking and paramilitary violence; in Bolivia, the indigenous movement that took up the banner of a plurinational state; in Ecuador, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), whose actions include opposition to the use of their lands for oil and mineral extraction; in Chile, the Mapuche Arauco Malleco Coordination (CAM), which articulates the Mapuche people of that region for struggles from an anti-capitalist perspective. We also highlight the aforementioned struggle of the Kurdish people against governments, states (Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran) and fundamentalist forces such as Daesh/ISIS. In addition to what has already been mentioned, it is important to point out the significance of the so-called Rojava Revolution, which has been led by the Kurds since 2012 in northern Syria. With all its limitations and contradictions (which include receiving money from the US and failing to take a stand against the genocide of Palestinians in Gaza), this struggle has sought to build an ecological and multi-ethnic society with a self-managed economy, grassroots democracy (without a state, based on communes and councils), and women’s liberation. There is some similarity to the libertarian socialist project, which can be explained, to a certain extent, by the influence that Murray Bookchin had on the democratic confederalism advocated by the PKK and Öcalan.
• Feminist struggles built on important previous developments, such as the founding of the Combahee River Collective in 1974 in the United States and the women’s strike of 1975 in Iceland. Between 1985 and 2024, they endorsed broader agendas, including demands for reproductive rights, equality in work outside and inside the home, and also for combating the objectification, harassment, violence and murder of women (femicide). During these years, there were different currents of feminism around the world: liberal, radical, postmodern, socialist, intersectional, etc. Some of them, such as the latter two, insisted on the need to relate the issue of gender to others, such as class, race, and ethnicity. In addition, there have been massive movements and protests, which, especially since the turn of the century, have had international visibility and impact, some of which have stood out. The World March of Women, created in 2000, brought together women from more than 150 countries in a campaign against poverty and gender violence. The March held large street demonstrations and other events, delivering a document signed by more than 5 million people supporting its demands to the UN in the United States. It continued in the following years and continues to this day in countries such as Brazil. The SlutWalk, which began in 2011 in Canada, has spread over the years to all continents. It became known for its street demonstrations denouncing rape culture and violence against women. The Ni Una Menos [Not One Less] movement was formed in Argentina in 2015 and also spread to several other countries around the world, mobilising women in subsequent years against gender violence and femicide. The 2018 Feminist Strike in Spain united movements and trade unions in a strike involving millions of people to denounce, among other issues, inequalities between men and women in relation to domestic work and wages. Feminism in recent years has also been reinforced by initiatives on social media, such as the #MeToo movement in 2017, which denounced cases of abuse of power and sexual harassment on the internet; by street demonstrations that confronted the growth of more radicalised expressions of the right, as occurred in the US in 2017 and in South Korea in 2024; and by institutional actions, such as those promoted by the UN throughout the period analysed – examples in this direction range from the World Conference on Women (Nairobi, Kenya, 1985) to the “16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence” campaign, which involved 180 countries in 2023. And also by demonstrations that took place in India in 2012 and Iran in 2022. Among the movement’s many achievements, the one concerning abortion rights is particularly impressive, having occurred in countries such as Canada (1988), South Africa (1994), Switzerland (1999), Nepal (2002), Portugal (2007), Spain (2010), Uruguay (2012), Mozambique (2014), Poland (2016), Ireland (2018), Argentina (2020), Mexico (2021), South Korea (2021) and Colombia (2022).
• LGBT+ struggles were also carried out taking into account previous relevant experiences, such as the Stonewall Riots in the United States in 1969 and the first LGBT+ Pride Parades in the world. It is clear that between 1985 and 2024, the LGBT+ movement gained considerable visibility and social strength. First, with demands relating to gays and lesbians, and later, to the trans population. Among the most significant agendas promoted during this period, which led to achievements in many countries, are: the decriminalisation of homosexuality and transsexuality, and the removal of both from mental illness codes; the legal and social recognition of same-sex marriage and the gender identity of the trans population; and the end of discrimination and violence against LGBT+ people. As in anti-racist and feminist movements, there were different perspectives and currents of LGBT+ activism, often contradictory to each other. Among the public manifestations of these struggles, those that gained the most visibility and international influence were undoubtedly the LGBT+ Pride Parades, which, through street demonstrations and protests, promoted diversity, equality, and respect for sexual differences. The parades began in 1970 in the United States and spread to every continent in the following decades. In certain locations, such as São Paulo, they currently bring together millions of people. Also noteworthy in the years evaluated were: the ACT UP movement in the United States and England, which, during the 1980s and 1990s, championed rights for the LGBT+ population in the context of the AIDS epidemic; and the countless protests against violence affecting this population, many of them after assaults or murders, as in the cases of 1991 and 1998 in the United States, and 2021 in Mexico. And, in the context of the strengthening of the far right and LGBT+phobic policies of their governments, those demonstrations confronted them in Russia (2013), the United States (2017), Poland (2020), Hungary (2022) and South Korea (2024). Finally, it is worth mentioning the pressure that has been exerted on the UN since the 1990s and the measures that have been adopted since then, ranging from the 1991 Resolution on the Decriminalisation of Homosexuality to the renewal of the Free & Equal Campaign in the 2020s.
• The ecological struggles of this period, like others, were established in the wake of notable previous experiences. Between the 1950s and 1970s, the environmental movement came together to denounce and combat nuclear testing and power plants, pesticide use, soil and water pollution and contamination, oil spills in the seas, whaling and deforestation. From then on, the discussion on sustainability gained momentum and, in the 1980s, the ecological movement acquired great social strength worldwide. Between 1985 and 2024, several mobilisations took place. Among the most visible movements, actions, and protests were: the demonstrations against pollution and acid rain, which took place in the 1980s in the United States, Canada, and Germany; the struggles of the Chipko movement in India throughout the 1990s to combat deforestation by logging companies in the Himalayan forests; the protests in Nigeria and other countries that followed the assassination of Ken Saro-Wiwa, who had denounced Shell’s environmental crimes in 1995; the struggles that began in Chile in 2015 against the exploitation of lithium by companies that were depleting water reserves in indigenous areas; the mobilisations in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia since 2022 to oppose the importation of plastic waste from rich countries. During these years, there were also initiatives with broad transnational impact: the participation of ecological movements in international struggles against neoliberalism, especially in the Global Resistance Movement between the late 1990s and early 2000s; the activities of the Extinction Rebellion movement, starting in 2018, which reached dozens of countries; the 2019 Global Climate Strike, which mobilised millions of people around the world to demand measures to combat climate change, and in which the participation of Youth for Climate was decisive. However, initiatives in favour of the environment were, in most cases, concentrated in NGOs such as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and in the UN. Promoting the need to build “green capitalism“, the UN, with the support of states and companies, has promoted a series of meetings and agreements, including the Montreal Protocol (1987), Agenda 21 (1992), the Kyoto Protocol (2002), the Paris Agreement (2015) and the various Conferences of the Parties (COPs).
• When studying these struggles involving gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and the environment over the last four decades, some more analytical comments can be made. First of all, it is clear that, even though they had been present before, it was during these years that the struggles against racism, patriarchy, and environmental destruction took on a very prominent position in the world. On the one hand, this was very positive because, in a way, it drove a movement of “renewal” on the global left, which had to deal with these issues and incorporate feminist, anti-racist, and ecological agendas into its movements, organisations, and groups. These issues and agendas are fundamental, and any socialist project worthy of the name can no longer ignore them. On the other hand, the results of this growth have been ambiguous. While it is true that they have supported very important struggles on the international stage and achieved remarkable victories in many countries, it is also true that, in response to this scenario, a sector of the ruling classes and their institutions has embraced the issues of women, the LGBT+ population, Black people, indigenous peoples and environmental preservation, taking on a leading role. As a result, growing sectors of the struggles in question began to be guided by liberal or liberalising views, which detached them from classist, anti-capitalist and anti-statist perspectives. Perhaps the UN’s leading role is the greatest evidence of this, with its search for a form of capitalism or even progressive neoliberalism that reconciles class exploitation and domination with better conditions for women, LGBT+ people, oppressed peoples and some environmental protection. Another serious problem with these struggles was the considerable reproduction, albeit often unconscious, of neoliberal and capitalist-statist logic. This was evident in the strengthening of particularisms (“identitarianism” or “micronationalism”), which subsidised fratricidal struggles and fragmentations that ended up favouring the ruling classes, as well as conservative and even reactionary positions. For example, when sectors of feminism opposed the trans population, or when they claimed biological determinism, gender essentialism or misandric positions; when sectors of the black movement privileged their darkest-skinned members to the detriment of the less dark-skinned, or when they defended race essentialism or separatist nationalist positions; when sectors of women’s, LGBT+, black or oppressed ethnic movements confronted workers linked to the trade union movement; when sectors of the environmental movement embraced elitist, eugenicist and misanthropic positions. Even recognising that patriarchy and racism are reproduced within movements and struggles, these positions do not contribute to our project of self-managed popular power. Finally, the rise of the far right has posed other challenges to this situation. Not only because of attacks on anti-patriarchal and anti-racist agendas, climate denialism, and the repression of struggles, but also because it shifts the left to the centre on these issues and favours “front-line” positions, which are unable to confront these attacks.

NOTES

1 We use GDP, at this point and going forward, to give a general idea of a country’s economic activity and wealth production, even though we are aware of the limitations of this indicator. In addition to being a general indicator, which needs to be understood in detail and in conjunction with others, GDP does not distinguish between forms of economic capital. For example, a bank that generates profits from the interest it charges its customers is considered a company that is producing wealth… Furthermore, GDP alone does not reveal a very important economic phenomenon, which is the transfer of economic capital from one country to another by foreign companies operating abroad. For example, a US company that produces in Brazil, but whose profits and dividends are repatriated to the US, has its results accounted for in Brazilian GDP…

2 We use unemployment rates, at this point and going forward, only to give a general idea, based on official data that make this calculation. We do this knowing that these rates do not accurately explain the issue of employment/unemployment, occupation/unemployment at work. In the case of Brazil, for example, taking into account IBGE data and methodology, it is more important to know the size of Brazil’s surplus labour force than to know the percentage or number of officially unemployed people. We will address this topic in more detail when we discuss Brazil.

3 A crisis is a moment of instability or even collapse/rupture of a system or part of it and, therefore, a phenomenon that implies a context of qualitative change in the systemic normality of society. It can be structural or cyclical and is usually sudden/unpredictable and of limited duration. It is common for the ruling classes (or at least sectors of them) to benefit from crises and for their consequences to imply losses for the oppressed classes. In this analysis, we use crisis both in the sense of collapse/rupture – when we talk about the crisis of the socialist bloc, for example – and in the sense of instability – when we talk about the various crises that capitalism-statism has been going through, in the world and in Brazil. Therefore, we are not diagnosing, either in this or in other passages, a “crisis of capitalism” or any other type of crisis, “cyclical” or otherwise, that points to the collapse or rupture (i.e., the end) of capitalism, much less to the possibility of building socialism in the short or medium term.

4 As we have already stated, we will not engage in conceptual discussions in this text. However, it is worth noting that our conception of social classes differs from the most well-known approaches, whether Marxist or liberal. “Social classes are defined by ownership of economic, political, and intellectual-moral means […]. And the struggle between dominant and oppressed classes is the main (though not the only) social conflict in capitalist-statist society – its greatest contradiction. […] In the capitalist-statist system, the movement of production and reproduction of social classes is explained by four forms of domination: the exploitation of labour (appropriation of labour surpluses; the majority works to provide profit and well-being to a minority), physical coercion (violence and repression; a minority kills, imprisons and intimidates the majority), political-bureaucratic domination (command and obedience; a minority decides and the majority follows the deliberations) and intellectual-moral domination (monopoly on the production and dissemination of ideas, information, worldviews; legitimisation of relations of domination; a minority produces and distributes these ideas, information and worldviews, and the majority ‘consumes’ and reproduces them). These four forms of domination unify concrete social classes (landowners, bourgeoisie, proletariat, peasantry, etc.) into two broader and contradictory groups: ruling classes and oppressed classes, which, in capitalism-statism, are in permanent conflict, struggle, and contradiction. (OSL, “Our Principles and General Strategy”)

5 In this analysis, we will focus only on the dominant and oppressed classes, leaving out the intermediate sectors. However, for informational purposes, we will include some notes about them here. The intermediate sectors currently represent just over 11% of the Brazilian population and are divided into two distinct classes: the petty bourgeoisie and middle managers, the former being much larger than the latter. The petty bourgeoisie includes small business owners (industry, services, commerce), “liberal professionals” (highly qualified, such as dentists, doctors, lawyers, etc.), high intellectuals, and major influencers. Middle managers include managers and lower-level directors of medium and large companies, including in the areas of education and communication.6 As pointed out, this criterion for defining colour/race (in Brazil, black = black + brown, based on IBGE data) has problems. This is because, among those identified as “brown”, there are many indigenous people. In other words, assuming the aforementioned criterion means overestimating black people and underestimating indigenous people. Even though the category “indigenous” has been included since the 1991 Census, the fact is that the category “brown,” by aggregating “mixed-race” people – who declare themselves to be a mixture of two or more races (among blacks, indigenous people and/or whites) – also ends up encompassing descendants of indigenous people. Different analysts even argue that most indigenous people end up identifying themselves as “brown” in these surveys. Although there is a broad and complex debate on the subject, we believe that the best way to deal with such data is, on the one hand, not to politically claim the concept of “brown”, but rather “black” and “indigenous”; and, on the other hand, to recognise that, of the five categories used by the IBGE (white, black, brown, yellow and indigenous), three are victims of racism in Brazil: blacks, browns and indigenous people – always bearing in mind that there are a considerable number of indigenous people in the statistics for brown people.